/

CVE-2026-61767

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Unsafe Deserialization (CWE-502) in NVIDIA Megatron Bridge

CVE-2026-61767

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-502

Impact:

Code Execution, Data Integrity Loss, and Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

NVIDIA Megatron Bridge contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that may allow attacker-controlled data to be processed as executable object state. A successful exploit could enable code execution, data tampering, or disclosure of sensitive information when untrusted serialized data reaches the affected processing path.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in NVIDIA Megatron Bridge components that deserialize structured or serialized data without sufficiently restricting the types or behaviors that can be reconstructed. Risk depends on whether an attacker can supply, modify, or influence serialized input processed by the affected application or workflow.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: A Megatron Bridge workflow or service that accepts or processes serialized data
  • Required access: The ability to supply, modify, or otherwise influence data that reaches the deserialization routine
  • Trigger point: Application processing of the attacker-influenced serialized object
  • Why exploitation is possible: Deserialization may reconstruct attacker-controlled objects or invoke unintended behavior before the data is adequately validated

Why this happens

The underlying issue is the use of a deserialization mechanism that treats untrusted serialized data as a trusted description of objects or application state. If object types, constructors, or attributes are not strictly constrained, crafted input can cause unintended code paths to execute during reconstruction. This behavior maps to CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute code within the privileges of the affected process
  • Sensitive configuration, model, or runtime information could be disclosed
  • Model, training, or pipeline data could be tampered with
  • The affected host or workload could be used for further compromise

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in serialized input and preventing deserialization from invoking arbitrary application behavior.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using data formats and parsers that do not support arbitrary object construction
  • Restricting deserialization to an explicit allowlist of safe types and fields
  • Validating structure, schema, size, and integrity before processing input
  • Avoiding serialized data from untrusted or weakly controlled sources
  • Applying strong authentication and authorization to data-ingestion interfaces
  • Running processing workloads with least privilege and limiting filesystem, network, and runtime permissions
  • Separating model or data processing from highly privileged control-plane services

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can include static analysis for generic or permissive deserialization APIs, dynamic object reconstruction, and deserialization of data received from external sources. Code reviews should examine trust boundaries, type allowlists, validation order, and whether deserialization occurs before authentication or integrity checks. Runtime monitoring can alert on unexpected child processes, filesystem changes, network connections, or access to sensitive resources from Megatron Bridge workloads. Policy enforcement may require approved serialization formats and prohibit unsafe object deserialization in production code.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5868
nvd.nist.govnvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61767
cve.orgcve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-61767

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on deployment and interface design. An attacker generally must be able to provide or influence serialized data that the affected Megatron Bridge component processes.

Authentication requirements are environment-dependent. The important prerequisite is access to an input path, storage location, pipeline, or service that supplies data to the vulnerable deserialization routine.

Replace permissive deserialization with a format and parser that support only the required data types, then enforce schema, integrity, and authorization checks before processing.

Treat serialized data as untrusted, use explicit type allowlists, minimize process privileges, and apply static analysis and security review policies to deserialization code paths.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.