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CVE-2026-61766

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Unsafe Deserialization (CWE-502) in NVIDIA Megatron Bridge

CVE-2026-61766

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-502

Impact:

Code Execution, Data Tampering, and Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

NVIDIA Megatron Bridge contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that may allow untrusted data to be processed as executable object data. Under conditions where an attacker can supply or influence serialized input, a successful exploit could enable code execution, data tampering, or information disclosure.

Affected context

The vulnerability may arise in NVIDIA Megatron Bridge deployments or workflows that deserialize data from sources that are not fully trusted. Risk depends on whether an attacker can introduce, replace, or influence serialized input before it is parsed, and on the permissions available to the process performing deserialization.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Application or workflow components that deserialize structured or serialized data
  • Required access: The ability to provide, modify, or cause processing of untrusted serialized input
  • Trigger point: A deserialization operation that interprets attacker-controlled object data
  • Why exploitation is possible: The parser may reconstruct objects or invoke behaviors beyond simple data parsing, allowing input to influence program execution

Why this happens

The underlying issue is the use of deserialization behavior that trusts serialized input to describe objects or executable state. When untrusted data is processed by a permissive deserializer, specially crafted content may cause unintended object construction or method execution. This matches CWE-502, Unsafe Deserialization, because external data is treated as trusted application state rather than as constrained data requiring validation.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute code in the affected process context.
  • Sensitive information could be disclosed.
  • Model, configuration, or other application data could be tampered with.
  • Compromised processes could be used for further unauthorized actions, depending on their privileges.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing trust from deserialization boundaries.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Prefer data-only formats and safe, restricted parsers over object-capable deserializers.
  • Enforce explicit schemas, type allowlists, and validation before data is used.
  • Treat model artifacts, checkpoints, configuration, and workflow inputs as untrusted unless their provenance is verified.
  • Apply integrity and authenticity controls to serialized files and transport paths.
  • Run deserialization workloads with least privilege and isolate them from sensitive resources.
  • Avoid restoring executable state when a plain-data representation is sufficient.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify related risks through:

  • Static analysis rules for deserialization APIs that support arbitrary object reconstruction.
  • Code review checks for loading serialized data from user-controlled, shared, or external locations.
  • Dependency and policy scans that flag unsafe parser modes or object-capable loading functions.
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, file changes, network connections, or access to secrets during data loading.
  • CI policies requiring schema validation, provenance checks, and safe parsing for serialized artifacts.

Automated code review and software composition analysis tools may help surface these patterns, but findings should be verified against the actual data flow and deployment context.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5868
nvd.nist.govnvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61766
cve.orgcve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-61766

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on whether an attacker can deliver or influence serialized data processed by the affected workflow. A network path is not required if untrusted files or artifacts can be introduced through local, shared, or automated pipeline access.

The attacker generally needs a way to supply, replace, or manipulate input that reaches the vulnerable deserialization operation. The resulting impact also depends on the permissions of the process handling that input.

Replace permissive object deserialization with a data-only parser, enforce an explicit schema and allowed types, and validate the input before it reaches application logic.

Maintain clear trust boundaries for serialized artifacts, verify their integrity and provenance, restrict deserialization privileges, and use static analysis and CI policies to prevent unsafe parser usage.

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