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CVE-2026-61764

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Unsafe Deserialization (CWE-502) in Megatron Bridge

CVE-2026-61764

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-502

Impact:

Code Execution, Data Tampering, and Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

NVIDIA Megatron Bridge contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that may allow untrusted data to be processed as executable object definitions. Under conditions where an attacker can supply or alter data reaching the deserialization path, successful exploitation could enable code execution, data tampering, and information disclosure.

Affected context

The vulnerability may affect Megatron Bridge deployments or workflows that deserialize attacker-influenced data without sufficiently restricting the permitted object types or validating the data before processing. Risk depends on whether untrusted input can reach the deserialization component and on the privileges available to the process performing the operation.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: An application, service, or workflow component that

deserializes structured data.

  • Required access: The ability to provide, modify, or cause processing of

data consumed by the vulnerable deserialization path.

  • Trigger point: Deserialization of the attacker-influenced data. - Why exploitation is possible: The deserializer may reconstruct unsafe

objects or invoke behavior beyond the intended data model.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is the use of a deserialization mechanism that treats untrusted serialized content as capable of defining executable or otherwise privileged objects. This insecure trust boundary maps to CWE-502, Unsafe Deserialization, because input is reconstructed without adequately limiting types, behavior, or provenance. If attacker-controlled content reaches this operation, deserialization may produce effects beyond simple data parsing.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute code with the privileges of the affected process.
  • Application or training data could be modified or corrupted.
  • Sensitive information may be disclosed.
  • A compromised process could be used for lateral movement or further system abuse.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally centers on eliminating unsafe deserialization paths and reducing trust in serialized input. Secure-by-default alternatives include data-only formats and parsers that allow only explicitly approved primitive types. Strict schemas, integrity checks, and validation before processing can reduce input ambiguity, while avoiding runtime object construction from untrusted content limits exposure. Deserialization components should operate with least privilege, restricted filesystem and network access, and isolated runtime permissions where practical.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection may include static analysis for generic deserialization APIs, dynamic object reconstruction, custom class loading, or deserializers that accept untrusted sources. Code reviews can look for serialized data crossing network, file, job, or user-controlled boundaries without integrity and type restrictions. Policy enforcement can require approved data-only formats, schema validation, and security review for parser changes. Automated application-security and code-review tools may help identify these patterns, but findings should be verified against actual data flow and deployment controls.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5868
nvd.nist.govnvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61764
cve.orgcve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-61764

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on deployment and data flow. It may be remotely reachable if an external or lower-trust actor can cause crafted serialized data to be processed.

The attacker generally needs a way to supply, modify, or influence data consumed by the affected deserialization path. The required level of access depends on the surrounding application and workflow controls.

Replace unsafe deserialization with a data-only, allowlisted parser and enforce strict schema and integrity validation before processing.

Track serialized-data trust boundaries, restrict object construction, apply least privilege to processing jobs, and enforce secure parser policies through code review and CI checks.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.