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CVE-2026-61756

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Unsafe Deserialization (CWE-502) in NVIDIA Megatron Bridge

CVE-2026-61756

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-502

Impact:

Code Execution, Data Tampering, and Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

NVIDIA Megatron Bridge contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that may allow untrusted data to be processed as executable object state. Under conditions where an attacker can supply or influence serialized input, a successful exploit could enable code execution, data tampering, and information disclosure.

Affected context

The vulnerability may occur in Megatron Bridge deployments or workflows that deserialize data originating outside a fully trusted administrative boundary. Risk depends on how serialized inputs are acquired, stored, transferred, and processed, as well as the permissions available to the affected process.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Application or workflow components that deserialize

serialized data

  • Required access: Ability to provide, replace, or influence serialized input - Trigger point: Processing of the attacker-influenced data by the vulnerable

deserialization path

  • Why exploitation is possible: Untrusted serialized content may cause

unintended object construction or execution during deserialization

Why this happens

The underlying issue is the use of a deserialization mechanism that does not adequately distinguish data from executable object behavior. When serialized input is trusted without strict type restrictions, an attacker may influence object reconstruction and trigger unintended operations. This behavior maps to CWE-502, Unsafe Deserialization.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute code with the privileges of the affected process.
  • Sensitive information could be disclosed.
  • Training data, configuration, or model-related data could be tampered with.
  • The affected workload could be used as a foothold for further compromise.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally centers on eliminating deserialization of untrusted object graphs and using data-only, restricted formats or safe parsers by default. Input trust should be reduced through authenticated sources, integrity checks, strict schemas, explicit type allowlists, and validation before data is used. Deserialization should run with least-privilege accounts, limited filesystem and network access, and isolated execution boundaries where feasible.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches include static analysis for generic or unrestricted deserialization APIs, review of code paths that reconstruct arbitrary objects, and repository searches for serialized input crossing trust boundaries. Code review should examine whether source authenticity, integrity, schema, and permitted types are enforced before parsing. Policy enforcement can require approved data-only formats and prohibit unsafe deserialization libraries or modes; automated security review tools may help identify these patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5868
nvd.nist.govnvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61756
cve.orgcve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-61756

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on whether an attacker can supply or influence serialized

data processed by Megatron Bridge. Network exposure, shared storage, workflow

integrations, and access controls determine the practical scope.

The attacker generally needs a way to place, replace, or modify input that

reaches the vulnerable deserialization path. The required permissions depend

on the deployment architecture and data-ingestion workflow.

Avoid deserializing untrusted object graphs. Prefer restricted, data-only

formats with explicit schemas, permitted types, integrity validation, and

safe parsing behavior.

Minimize trust in external inputs, enforce parser and type policies during

development and CI, and run data-processing components with least privilege

and appropriate isolation.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.