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CVE-2026-61751

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

Unsafe Deserialization (CWE-502) in Megatron Bridge

CVE-2026-61751

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unsafe Deserialization

CWE:

CWE-502

Impact:

Code Execution, Data Tampering, and Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

NVIDIA Megatron Bridge contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that may allow untrusted data to be processed as executable object state. A successful attack could enable code execution, data tampering, and information disclosure when an attacker can influence serialized input.

Affected context

The vulnerability applies to Megatron Bridge workflows or components that deserialize data from a source an attacker can influence. Exploitability depends on how serialized data enters the application, whether it is authenticated or integrity-protected, and the privileges of the process performing deserialization.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Application or workflow interfaces that accept or retrieve serialized data - Required access: Ability to provide, modify, or cause processing of untrusted serialized input - Trigger point: A deserialization operation performed by Megatron Bridge - Why exploitation is possible: Deserialization may interpret attacker-controlled object data as executable behavior rather than treating it solely as inert data

Why this happens

The underlying bug is the use of a deserialization mechanism that does not sufficiently constrain the types or behaviors represented in incoming data. When untrusted serialized content is converted into runtime objects, crafted state may trigger unintended operations during or after reconstruction. This behavior maps to CWE-502, Unsafe Deserialization, because input controlled by an insufficiently trusted party is processed as executable object structure.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute code with the privileges of the affected process.
  • Sensitive information could be disclosed from the application or its environment.
  • Model, training, or configuration data could be tampered with.
  • The affected workload could be used to access connected systems or resources.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing unsafe deserialization paths and reducing trust in serialized inputs. Secure-by-default alternatives include using data-only formats or restricted parsers with explicit type allowlists, validating content against a strict schema before use, and applying integrity and authenticity checks where inputs cross trust boundaries. Configuration and artifact sources can be made immutable or access-controlled, while workloads should run with least privilege and limited access to sensitive files, credentials, and network resources.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can include static analysis for generic or unrestricted deserialization APIs, review of code paths that reconstruct objects from files or network responses, and inventory of serialized-data ingestion points. Code review should examine whether input provenance, integrity, type restrictions, and validation are explicit. Policy enforcement can require approved data-only parsers, schema validation, and authenticated artifact sources. Automated security review tools may help identify suspicious deserialization patterns for manual assessment.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/NVIDIA/product-security/tree/main/2026/5868
nvd.nist.govnvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61751
cve.orgcve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-61751

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on deployment. An attacker generally must be able to

influence serialized data that a Megatron Bridge process will deserialize;

that influence may come through a network service, shared storage, workflow

input, or another connected system.

No universal access requirement can be established from the vulnerability

description. Authentication may be required to reach the relevant input

path, but any user, service, or integration able to control processed data

could be relevant.

Avoid deserializing untrusted data into arbitrary runtime objects. Prefer

restricted, data-only parsing with explicit schemas, type allowlists, and

integrity verification before processing.

Track serialized-data trust boundaries, enforce approved parser policies in

CI and code review, limit workload privileges, and test that malformed or

attacker-controlled inputs cannot invoke unintended object behavior.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.