Summary
SOCFortress CoPilot contains stored cross-site scripting flaws in portal fields that render user-controlled and server-stored markup without escaping or sanitization. When a victim views poisoned alert, case, asset, or health-check content, script may execute in the application origin, enabling token theft, account impersonation, and unauthorized data or incident operations.
SOCFortress CoPilot contains stored cross-site scripting flaws in portal fields that render user-controlled and server-stored markup without escaping or sanitization. When a victim views poisoned alert, case, asset, or health-check content, script may execute in the application origin, enabling token theft, account impersonation, and unauthorized data or incident operations.
Affected context
The issue occurs in customer-portal views that pass stored values to Vue's v-html rendering mechanism without a trusted sanitization boundary. Relevant data can enter through incident alert comments and may also be present in SOC case, asset, and health-check fields. The risk is greatest when analysts or administrators view attacker-controlled content and authentication tokens are accessible to JavaScript.
The issue occurs in customer-portal views that pass stored values to Vue's v-html rendering mechanism without a trusted sanitization boundary. Relevant data can enter through incident alert comments and may also be present in SOC case, asset, and health-check fields. The risk is greatest when analysts or administrators view attacker-controlled content and authentication tokens are accessible to JavaScript.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated customer-portal alert, case, asset, and health-check views
- Required access: Ability to submit or influence content stored in an affected record
- Trigger point: A user views the affected record in a vulnerable portal component
- Why exploitation is possible: Stored markup is rendered through an unsanitized HTML sink, while access and refresh tokens are available to client-side code
- Attack surface: Authenticated customer-portal alert, case, asset, and health-check views
- Required access: Ability to submit or influence content stored in an affected record
- Trigger point: A user views the affected record in a vulnerable portal component
- Why exploitation is possible: Stored markup is rendered through an unsanitized HTML sink, while access and refresh tokens are available to client-side code
Why this happens
The underlying bug is a failure to treat stored content as untrusted before rendering it as HTML. Values are transformed for display but are not contextually escaped or sanitized before reaching v-html, allowing markup and script-capable content to execute in the viewer's origin. This maps to CWE-79, Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation. The use of JavaScript-readable access and refresh token storage, associated with CWE-922, increases the consequence because injected code may access those credentials.
The underlying bug is a failure to treat stored content as untrusted before rendering it as HTML. Values are transformed for display but are not contextually escaped or sanitized before reaching v-html, allowing markup and script-capable content to execute in the viewer's origin. This maps to CWE-79, Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation. The use of JavaScript-readable access and refresh token storage, associated with CWE-922, increases the consequence because injected code may access those credentials.
Potential impact
- An attacker may steal access and refresh tokens from affected viewers.
- A stolen token may enable impersonation of analysts or administrators.
- Attackers could gain unauthorized access across tenant boundaries.
- Incident records may be modified, deleted, or otherwise manipulated.
- Detection and response workflows could be subverted.
- The application origin and associated user session may be compromised.
- An attacker may steal access and refresh tokens from affected viewers.
- A stolen token may enable impersonation of analysts or administrators.
- Attackers could gain unauthorized access across tenant boundaries.
- Incident records may be modified, deleted, or otherwise manipulated.
- Detection and response workflows could be subverted.
- The application origin and associated user session may be compromised.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating unsafe HTML rendering and
reducing the value of any script that executes in the portal.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer context-aware output encoding and plain-text rendering by default.
- When rich text is required, apply a narrowly scoped, well-maintained HTML sanitizer before rendering.
- Enforce server-side validation and sanitization rather than relying only on client-side checks.
- Avoid using v-html or equivalent sinks for untrusted or insufficiently trusted fields.
- Store authentication credentials in mechanisms that are not readable by page scripts, with appropriate cookie protections where suitable.
- Use short-lived access credentials, rotation, revocation, and narrowly scoped privileges.
- Apply strong content security policies and frame protections as defense in depth.
- Enforce tenant isolation and least privilege for portal actions and API tokens.
Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating unsafe HTML rendering and
reducing the value of any script that executes in the portal.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer context-aware output encoding and plain-text rendering by default.
- When rich text is required, apply a narrowly scoped, well-maintained HTML sanitizer before rendering.
- Enforce server-side validation and sanitization rather than relying only on client-side checks.
- Avoid using v-html or equivalent sinks for untrusted or insufficiently trusted fields.
- Store authentication credentials in mechanisms that are not readable by page scripts, with appropriate cookie protections where suitable.
- Use short-lived access credentials, rotation, revocation, and narrowly scoped privileges.
- Apply strong content security policies and frame protections as defense in depth.
- Enforce tenant isolation and least privilege for portal actions and API tokens.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules for v-html, innerHTML, unsafe template interpolation, and equivalent HTML sinks.
- Code review checks tracing user and server-stored fields into browser rendering APIs.
- Repository searches for JavaScript-readable token persistence and client-side credential access.
- Dynamic tests that submit benign markup markers and verify contextual encoding or sanitization.
- Content Security Policy reporting and monitoring for unexpected script execution attempts.
- Policy enforcement in CI that blocks unsafe rendering patterns or requires approved sanitizer wrappers.
- Automated security review tools that model data flow from storage and APIs to DOM sinks.
Organizations can identify this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules for v-html, innerHTML, unsafe template interpolation, and equivalent HTML sinks.
- Code review checks tracing user and server-stored fields into browser rendering APIs.
- Repository searches for JavaScript-readable token persistence and client-side credential access.
- Dynamic tests that submit benign markup markers and verify contextual encoding or sanitization.
- Content Security Policy reporting and monitoring for unexpected script execution attempts.
- Policy enforcement in CI that blocks unsafe rendering patterns or requires approved sanitizer wrappers.
- Automated security review tools that model data flow from storage and APIs to DOM sinks.
