Summary
SOCFortress CoPilot's upload endpoint allows a low-privilege customer user to select arbitrary storage buckets and object names without effective tenant, ownership, or content restrictions. This may enable cross-tenant evidence tampering, endpoint telemetry disruption, report-template poisoning, unauthorized data placement, or storage exhaustion when the attacker can authenticate as a customer user.
SOCFortress CoPilot's upload endpoint allows a low-privilege customer user to select arbitrary storage buckets and object names without effective tenant, ownership, or content restrictions. This may enable cross-tenant evidence tampering, endpoint telemetry disruption, report-template poisoning, unauthorized data placement, or storage exhaustion when the attacker can authenticate as a customer user.
Affected context
The issue occurs in CoPilot deployments where the customer-user upload route accepts caller-controlled bucket and object names. Risk is highest when uploaded objects are later consumed as endpoint configuration, server-rendered templates, case evidence, or forensic artifacts, and when storage operations automatically create buckets or overwrite existing objects without tenant ownership checks.
The issue occurs in CoPilot deployments where the customer-user upload route accepts caller-controlled bucket and object names. Risk is highest when uploaded objects are later consumed as endpoint configuration, server-rendered templates, case evidence, or forensic artifacts, and when storage operations automatically create buckets or overwrite existing objects without tenant ownership checks.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated
POST /api/agent_data_store/uploadAPI requests - Required access: A valid low-privilege
customer_useraccount - Trigger point: Upload processing with attacker-selected
bucket_nameandobject_namevalues - Why exploitation is possible: The write path lacks an allowlist, tenant prefix enforcement, ownership validation, and meaningful content restrictions; object upserts can overwrite resources belonging to other tenants
- Attack surface: Authenticated
POST /api/agent_data_store/uploadAPI requests - Required access: A valid low-privilege
customer_useraccount - Trigger point: Upload processing with attacker-selected
bucket_nameandobject_namevalues - Why exploitation is possible: The write path lacks an allowlist, tenant prefix enforcement, ownership validation, and meaningful content restrictions; object upserts can overwrite resources belonging to other tenants
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is an authorization failure in a multi-tenant object-storage write operation. The endpoint treats user-controlled storage identifiers as trusted and permits bucket creation and object upserts without verifying that the requested resource belongs to the authenticated tenant or that the caller is authorized to modify it. This maps primarily to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, with aspects of CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key and CWE-862: Missing Authorization.
The underlying flaw is an authorization failure in a multi-tenant object-storage write operation. The endpoint treats user-controlled storage identifiers as trusted and permits bucket creation and object upserts without verifying that the requested resource belongs to the authenticated tenant or that the caller is authorized to modify it. This maps primarily to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, with aspects of CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key and CWE-862: Missing Authorization.
Potential impact
- An attacker may overwrite evidence or forensic artifacts belonging to another tenant.
- An attacker could alter Sysmon configuration objects and may blind or change telemetry collected from managed endpoints.
- An attacker could poison server-rendered report templates, potentially creating a later code-execution risk depending on rendering safeguards.
- An attacker may plant misleading data or disrupt investigations.
- An attacker could consume excessive storage by creating arbitrary objects or buckets.
- An attacker may overwrite evidence or forensic artifacts belonging to another tenant.
- An attacker could alter Sysmon configuration objects and may blind or change telemetry collected from managed endpoints.
- An attacker could poison server-rendered report templates, potentially creating a later code-execution risk depending on rendering safeguards.
- An attacker may plant misleading data or disrupt investigations.
- An attacker could consume excessive storage by creating arbitrary objects or buckets.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally centers on enforcing authorization at the storage-operation boundary rather than trusting request parameters.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving bucket and object names from authenticated tenant and resource identifiers instead of accepting unrestricted caller-selected paths.
- Applying explicit allowlists for writable resource classes and permitted object-name formats.
- Performing server-side tenant ownership and case-level authorization checks before every create, update, or overwrite operation.
- Separating upload permissions for configuration, templates, evidence, and forensic artifacts.
- Restricting template content and rendering it with a hardened, non-executable model.
- Enforcing object-size, bucket-count, quota, and content-type limits.
- Running downstream consumers with least privilege and isolating tenant data.
- Using immutable or versioned storage for evidence and audit logging for all write operations.
Mitigation generally centers on enforcing authorization at the storage-operation boundary rather than trusting request parameters.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving bucket and object names from authenticated tenant and resource identifiers instead of accepting unrestricted caller-selected paths.
- Applying explicit allowlists for writable resource classes and permitted object-name formats.
- Performing server-side tenant ownership and case-level authorization checks before every create, update, or overwrite operation.
- Separating upload permissions for configuration, templates, evidence, and forensic artifacts.
- Restricting template content and rendering it with a hardened, non-executable model.
- Enforcing object-size, bucket-count, quota, and content-type limits.
- Running downstream consumers with least privilege and isolating tenant data.
- Using immutable or versioned storage for evidence and audit logging for all write operations.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can combine application review, runtime monitoring, and policy enforcement:
- Use static analysis and code review to identify storage APIs that receive bucket or object identifiers directly from request fields.
- Look for missing tenant, ownership, case-access, and role checks on create, overwrite, and delete-capable operations.
- Review routes for authorization asymmetry, especially where list or download operations are restricted but upload writes are broadly available.
- Monitor object-write logs for cross-tenant identifiers, unexpected bucket creation, repeated overwrites, unusual object-name patterns, and quota spikes.
- Add automated tests that attempt unauthorized writes across tenants and to protected configuration or template objects.
- Enforce API policies requiring server-derived resource scopes and explicit authorization decisions before storage writes.
Detection can combine application review, runtime monitoring, and policy enforcement:
- Use static analysis and code review to identify storage APIs that receive bucket or object identifiers directly from request fields.
- Look for missing tenant, ownership, case-access, and role checks on create, overwrite, and delete-capable operations.
- Review routes for authorization asymmetry, especially where list or download operations are restricted but upload writes are broadly available.
- Monitor object-write logs for cross-tenant identifiers, unexpected bucket creation, repeated overwrites, unusual object-name patterns, and quota spikes.
- Add automated tests that attempt unauthorized writes across tenants and to protected configuration or template objects.
- Enforce API policies requiring server-derived resource scopes and explicit authorization decisions before storage writes.
