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CVE-2026-61668

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Improper Certificate Validation (CWE-295) in DIRAC Pilot

CVE-2026-61668

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Certificate Validation

CWE:

CWE-295

Impact:

Arbitrary Code Execution and Credential Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

DIRAC's pilot wrapper downloads executable pilot code and its reference checksum without validating the TLS server certificate. An attacker who can redirect or intercept grid-site network traffic may replace both files, causing arbitrary code execution in the pilot context and potentially exposing pilot proxy credentials.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in DIRAC deployments that use the affected pilot wrapper to retrieve the second-stage pilot archive and its checksum over a channel where TLS certificates are not verified. It becomes risky when an attacker can influence DNS resolution, routing, or another network path between a grid site and the remote download service.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network retrieval of the second-stage pilot archive and reference checksum
  • Required access: Capability to intercept or redirect traffic, such as through DNS or routing manipulation
  • Trigger point: Pilot wrapper download and validation during pilot startup
  • Why exploitation is possible: The downloader accepts an unverified TLS connection, and the attacker can substitute both the executable archive and its checksum

Why this happens

The pilot wrapper uses an unverified TLS context for security-sensitive downloads. Because the server certificate is not checked against system or grid trust anchors, an intercepted connection can appear valid to the client. Downloading the checksum through the same unauthenticated channel also prevents it from independently establishing the archive's integrity. This behavior maps to CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation, where a client fails to authenticate the peer before trusting transferred content.

Potential impact

  • Arbitrary code execution in the pilot process context
  • Compromise or misuse of pilot proxy credentials
  • Unauthorized access to grid resources available to the pilot
  • Data integrity loss or tampering with distributed computing workloads
  • Lateral movement within reachable grid or site infrastructure

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on authenticating the download endpoint and separating transport authentication from content integrity checks.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using TLS clients that validate certificates against system trust stores or explicitly configured grid certificate directories
  • Rejecting connections when certificate validation fails or trust configuration is unavailable
  • Obtaining integrity metadata through an independently authenticated channel rather than the same unvalidated connection
  • Restricting pilot proxy permissions and limiting the resources accessible to pilot processes
  • Applying network egress controls and protected DNS and routing practices for grid sites
  • Treating downloaded executable content as untrusted until both origin and integrity are verified

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis rules for disabled certificate verification, unverified TLS contexts, and hostname-check bypasses
  • Code review checks covering downloads of executable content, archives, and checksums
  • Inventory and policy enforcement for approved trust stores and certificate directories
  • Network monitoring for unexpected download endpoints, certificate changes, redirects, or anomalous DNS and routing behavior
  • Automated dependency and secure-coding review tools that flag insecure transport configuration

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/DIRACGrid/DIRAC/commit/68029dfb5ddd8b1e4106851f8e37370aa80ac7ae
github.comgithub.com/DIRACGrid/DIRAC/commit/92e2e26c63b964b8499bee5e9c2e2821a36eac56
github.comgithub.com/DIRACGrid/DIRAC/commit/b332c437d064f66ee46f5b45a90a9f7c4bace38d
github.comgithub.com/DIRACGrid/DIRAC/releases/tag/v8.0.79
github.comgithub.com/DIRACGrid/DIRAC/releases/tag/v9.0.22
github.comgithub.com/DIRACGrid/DIRAC/releases/tag/v9.1.10
github.comgithub.com/DIRACGrid/DIRAC/security/advisories/GHSA-vg99-gr89-qhw9

Frequently asked

questions

It can be exploited remotely when an attacker can manipulate DNS, routing, or network traffic between a grid site and the pilot download service. It does not generally require direct access to the DIRAC host.

The attacker needs a position or capability that allows download traffic to be intercepted or redirected. Merely being able to submit an ordinary workload may not be sufficient.

Require normal TLS certificate and hostname validation using trusted system or grid certificate authorities, and ensure executable content and its integrity metadata are not both obtained through an unauthenticated channel.

Enforce secure transport policies in code review and CI, prohibit unverified TLS contexts, monitor trust-store configuration, and apply least privilege to pilot credentials and runtime processes.

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