Summary
Wallos improperly trusts an incoming OIDC email claim when linking an external identity to an existing local account, without confirming that the identity provider marked the email as verified.
If the configured identity provider permits arbitrary or unverified email addresses, an attacker may authenticate as another user, including an administrator, without knowing that user's password.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Wallos deployments using OIDC login during the affected version range when:
- An OIDC identity is matched to a local account by email address
- The application does not require a trusted
email_verifiedclaim - The configured identity provider allows users to present arbitrary or unverified email addresses
Risk depends on the identity provider's account-registration, tenant, and claim-validation policies.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: OIDC authentication and account-linking flow
- Required access: An account or authentication capability at the configured identity provider, depending on its policies
- Trigger point: OIDC login when Wallos maps the asserted email to an existing local account
- Why exploitation is possible: Wallos relies on an email claim without establishing that the provider has verified control of that address
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an improper authentication decision based on an identity attribute that is not sufficiently trustworthy.
Wallos links an external OIDC identity to a local account using the email claim alone, while omitting validation that the identity provider marked the claim as verified. This maps to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, because the application accepts an asserted identifier as proof of account ownership without validating the necessary assurance signal.
Potential impact
- An attacker may access another user's Wallos account
- An attacker could take over an administrator account
- Account data and subscription records may be exposed or altered
- An attacker may change account settings or authentication-related information
- Compromised accounts could be used to affect other users or connected workflows
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on making external identity linking depend on strongly verified identity attributes.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Requiring a trusted, validated
email_verifiedsignal before using email for account linking - Treating OIDC subject and issuer pairs as the primary stable identity rather than email alone
- Avoiding automatic linking when identity assurance is ambiguous
- Restricting OIDC providers and tenants to trusted administrative configurations
- Applying least privilege to administrative accounts and requiring stronger authentication where available
- Preserving explicit user confirmation or a secure reauthentication step for sensitive account-linking decisions
These controls reduce reliance on attacker-controlled or weakly verified claims.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review searches for account linking based only on OIDC email claims
- Checks that authentication flows validate issuer, audience, subject, and verified-claim semantics
- Tests using unverified, conflicting, or provider-controlled email identities
- Monitoring for unexpected OIDC links to existing accounts or administrative users
- Policy enforcement requiring approved identity providers and documented claim-validation rules
Automated application-security review tools may help identify authentication decisions that rely on untrusted identity attributes.

