Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SQL Injection in Simple ChatBox Endpoint

CVE-2026-6161

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-89

Impact:

Confidentiality and Integrity Compromise via SQL Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Simple ChatBox up to version 1.0 contains a SQL injection flaw in the /chatbox/insert.php endpoint, where the msg parameter is incorporated into database queries without proper sanitization.

A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to interfere with the application's SQL queries, which may lead to unauthorized data access, modification, or disruption of the chat system.

Affected context

The vulnerability exists in deployments of the Simple ChatBox application (up to version 1.0) where the /chatbox/insert.php endpoint is exposed and processes user-supplied chat messages.

The issue arises when the msg parameter is passed from HTTP requests into backend SQL statements without adequate validation, escaping, or use of safe query construction mechanisms.

Environments where the chatbox is publicly reachable over the network and connected to a production database are more exposed to potential impact.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP interface of the /chatbox/insert.php endpoint.
  • Required access: Network-level access to the web application; no special privileges are typically needed beyond the ability to send requests to the chat endpoint.
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted input via the msg parameter, typically through a chat message or direct HTTP request.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The msg value appears to be concatenated or interpolated directly into SQL statements without parameterization or robust input handling, enabling attackers to alter the intended query structure.

Why this happens

The core issue is the construction of SQL queries using untrusted input from the msg parameter without proper query parameterization or neutralization of control characters.

This behavior corresponds to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where user-controlled data is treated as part of the SQL command instead of as a data value.

The presence of CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component reflects that the database engine, as a downstream component, receives output that was not safely encoded for its context.

The insecure pattern is assembling SQL strings directly from request parameters rather than using prepared statements or an ORM that separates code and data.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized reading of chat-related or other application data stored in the database.
  • Modification or deletion of chat messages and potentially other application records.
  • Creation of new accounts or manipulation of existing user-related data, depending on schema and permissions.
  • Disruption of application behavior, including causing errors or denial of service through malformed queries.
  • Potential leverage of database access to pivot to broader system compromise in poorly segmented environments.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct string concatenation of SQL with user input and reducing trust in data received via HTTP endpoints:

  • Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database interactions involving user-controlled values such as msg.
  • Consider using a database abstraction layer or ORM that enforces separation between query structure and data by default.
  • Apply strict server-side validation and normalization to chat messages, constraining inputs to expected character sets and lengths.
  • Implement context-appropriate encoding or escaping at the database boundary when parameterization is not available, while recognizing it as a less robust fallback.
  • Run the database with least-privilege accounts so that the application can only perform necessary operations and cannot modify schema or sensitive non-chat tables.
  • Introduce centralized input-handling utilities so that all endpoints processing user text follow the same hardened patterns.

How teams detect issues like this

Identifying and monitoring for this class of vulnerability can involve:

  • Static analysis rules that flag dynamic SQL construction (e.g., string concatenation of query fragments with request parameters or $_GET/$_POST variables in PHP).
  • Targeted code review of database access layers and controller code handling the /chatbox/insert.php endpoint, with a focus on how msg is transformed before reaching query execution.
  • Security testing (including automated web application scanning) configured to probe parameters like msg for SQL injection behaviors.
  • Runtime monitoring for anomalous database queries (e.g., unexpected UNIONs, tautological predicates, or stacked statements) originating from chat-related routes.
  • CI/CD integration of automated code review tools or linters to enforce use of parameterized APIs for all new database interactions.

Sources

SourceLink
code-projects.orgcode-projects.org/
github.comgithub.com/ahmadmarz10-hub/CVEsMarz/blob/main/SQL%20Injection%20in%20Simple%20Chatbox%20PHP%20msg%20Parameter.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/796697
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/357041
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/357041/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker who can send requests to the Simple ChatBox application, including the /chatbox/insert.php endpoint, can attempt to exploit the SQL injection via the msg parameter.

Not necessarily. If the chat functionality is publicly accessible or requires only minimal interaction, an attacker can often exploit the issue without prior authentication, depending on how the endpoint is integrated into the application.

The most robust fix is to replace any dynamic SQL string construction involving msg with parameterized queries or prepared statements, and to ensure all data passed to the database is treated strictly as parameters rather than query text.

Adopting secure-by-default database access patterns—such as enforcing prepared statements in shared data access layers—combined with consistent input validation, security-focused code review, and automated static analysis for SQL injection patterns can significantly reduce the likelihood of similar issues.

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