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CVE-2026-61458

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Brute-Force Protection Failure (CWE-307) in PasswordPusher

CVE-2026-61458

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Brute-Force Protection Failure

CWE:

CWE-307

Impact:

Unauthorized Access to Protected Secrets

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

PasswordPusher before version 2.9.2 exposes a brute-force weakness in the /p/:token/access endpoint, where passphrases can be guessed repeatedly without effective route-level defenses.

An attacker who knows a push token can submit around 120 guesses per minute, making short or dictionary-based passphrases realistically discoverable within hours or days.

Affected context

The vulnerability arises in deployments of PasswordPusher that:

  • Rely on the /p/:token/access endpoint to gate access to password "pushes" using passphrases
  • Do not apply route-specific rate limiting or push-level lockout on failed attempts
  • Allow an attacker to obtain or guess a valid push token (e.g., via link sharing or leakage)

In this context, the passphrase is treated as the main barrier to viewing a secret, but insufficient throttling means repeated online guessing remains feasible for weak passphrases.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or internal HTTP(S) interface exposing POST /p/:token/access.
  • Required access: Knowledge of a valid push token; no prior authentication may be needed beyond that token.
  • Trigger point: Automated or scripted POST requests submitting repeated passphrase guesses to the same push.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint lacks granular rate limits and per-push lockout after consecutive failures, allowing sustained high-frequency guessing without meaningful penalties or alarms.

Why this happens

This issue is rooted in missing or insufficient brute-force defenses for a security-sensitive endpoint, matching CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts.

The design treats the push token and passphrase as combined access controls, yet the application does not enforce per-resource throttling, step-up friction, or temporary lockout when multiple incorrect passphrases are submitted.

As a result, the system effectively permits unbounded, high-rate online guessing, eroding the effective entropy of user-chosen passphrases and making weak combinations practically discoverable.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized access to secrets or credentials stored in individual pushes
  • Compromise of downstream systems if retrieved passwords are reused elsewhere
  • Exposure of sensitive operational or personal data shared via PasswordPusher
  • Erosion of trust in the platform's ability to safeguard time-limited or passphrase-protected secrets

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation typically focuses on strengthening online guessing resistance around sensitive endpoints and resources:

  • Introduce route-specific rate limiting for /p/:token/access, tuned to realistic human behavior rather than automated throughput.
  • Implement per-push lockout or backoff (e.g., exponential delays or temporary blocking) after a defined number of failed attempts.
  • Add progressive friction such as CAPTCHAs or additional checks after repeated failures, especially on anonymous or unauthenticated access.
  • Encourage or enforce high-entropy passphrases for protected pushes, reducing susceptibility to dictionary attacks.
  • Apply least-privilege handling of secrets, ensuring that even if a push is compromised, blast radius is minimized (e.g., single-use credentials, short validity windows).

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this vulnerability and its abuse through a combination of review and monitoring:

  • Static and configuration review: Check routing and middleware configurations to confirm that authentication or passphrase-protected endpoints have explicit rate-limiting and lockout logic.
  • Code review signals: Identify security-sensitive access checks that rely solely on shared secrets or passphrases, but lack accompanying throttling, backoff, or anomaly detection.
  • Log and behavior analysis: Monitor for repeated failed access attempts against the same push token, especially at machine-rate intervals, and flag or block such patterns.
  • Automated tooling: Utilize application security scanners or custom linting rules that highlight authentication or secret-access flows without brute-force protections.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/pglombardo/PasswordPusher/security/advisories/GHSA-59w3-h5v2-c4xw
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/passwordpusher-passphrase-brute-force-via-unthrottled-endpoint

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the PasswordPusher instance is accessible over the network and an attacker has a valid push token, they can conduct brute-force attempts remotely via the exposed HTTP(S) endpoint.

The attacker generally needs only knowledge of a valid push token; they do not require legitimate user credentials if the push is protected solely by a passphrase and token combination.

The most robust pattern combines per-endpoint rate limiting, per-push lockout or exponential backoff on failures, and clear handling of repeated errors, ensuring that high-frequency guessing becomes impractical.

Treat all passphrase- or token-gated resources as authentication surfaces: design them with built-in throttling, lockout, and anomaly detection, and include checks for these controls in security reviews and CI/CD pipelines.

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