Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

OS Command Injection in Totolink A7100RU setSyslogCfg CGI

CVE-2026-6025

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Router Firmware

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A command injection flaw in the setSyslogCfg function of the /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi handler in Totolink A7100RU firmware 7.4cu.2313_b20191024 allows attacker-controlled data from the enable parameter to be passed into system command execution.

When exposed over the network without proper hardening, this can let a remote attacker execute arbitrary OS commands on the router, potentially taking full control of the device.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the web management interface of the Totolink A7100RU router, specifically within the CGI handler that processes syslog configuration requests.

It is relevant when:

  • The device is running firmware version 7.4cu.2313_b20191024
  • The /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi endpoint is reachable over the network
  • User input for syslog configuration (including the enable parameter) is passed to underlying shell commands without strict validation or encoding

In such deployments, especially when the admin interface is exposed to untrusted networks, the risk of remote exploitation increases significantly.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface exposed by the router's web management UI
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted HTTP requests to /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi (may or may not require authentication, depending on configuration)
  • Trigger point: Submission of a syslog configuration request invoking setSyslogCfg with a malicious enable parameter
  • Why exploitation is possible: The enable argument is incorporated into an OS-level command without adequate sanitization, encoding, or use of a safe command-execution API, enabling injected shell metacharacters to alter the intended command.

Why this happens

The underlying bug is a classic OS command injection (CWE-78) in the CGI handler responsible for syslog configuration.

Application logic takes a parameter (enable) from an HTTP request and concatenates it into a shell command or passes it to a command interpreter in a way that allows the caller to inject additional shell syntax.

This stems from:

  • Treating HTTP parameters as trusted and command-safe
  • Building commands via string concatenation rather than using parameterized or API-level interfaces
  • Lacking canonicalization and validation to restrict values to a well-defined set (e.g., boolean flags only)

The absence of robust input validation and use of shell-unsafe patterns at the OS boundary is what maps this issue to CWE-78, often closely tied with improper neutralization of special elements used in command injection (CWE-77).

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary OS commands on the router
  • Complete compromise of router configuration and administration interface
  • Installation of persistent malware or backdoors on the device
  • Traffic interception, redirection, or DNS manipulation affecting all connected clients
  • Use of the compromised router as a pivot point for further attacks within the local network
  • Enrollment of the device into botnets for DDoS or other malicious activity

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigations focus on removing the ability for user-controlled input to influence shell interpretation and narrowing the trust boundary of the management interface:

  • Replace shell-based command construction with direct API calls or library functions that do not invoke a command interpreter
  • Constrain syslog-related parameters (especially enable) to strict whitelists or enumerations (e.g., 0/1) and reject anything outside the expected domain
  • Apply rigorous input validation and output encoding before interacting with any OS, shell, or external utilities
  • Run the web management and CGI components with least-privilege accounts and minimal capabilities to limit impact if a flaw is exploited
  • Restrict management interface exposure to trusted networks (e.g., internal LAN or VPN) and disable remote administration where not strictly needed
  • Use defense-in-depth controls like network firewalls and management-plane access controls to reduce the reachable attack surface

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-centric review with runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag any use of shell command execution functions (e.g., system, popen, exec* variants) where user input from HTTP parameters is concatenated into command strings
  • Code review: Look for CGI handlers and web endpoints that:
  • Parse query or form parameters and directly pass them into command strings
  • Lack centralized validation or use of strict whitelists for operational flags
  • Depend on shell pipelines or metacharacters in dynamically built commands
  • Policy enforcement: Adopt coding standards that:
  • Forbid shell invocation in web request handlers unless a vetted, wrapper API is used
  • Require documented validation for all externally supplied parameters
  • Runtime monitoring: Use network intrusion detection or WAF rules to detect suspicious patterns in requests (e.g., presence of ;, &&, |, backticks, or $() in parameters destined for management endpoints)
  • Automated tooling: Integrate SAST/DAST tools into the development lifecycle to highlight OS command injection patterns and unsafe command-building idioms early.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Litengzheng/vuldb_new/blob/main/A7100RU/vul_170/README.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/792046
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/356601
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/356601/cti
totolink.nettotolink.net/

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on how the router's management interface is exposed. If /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi is reachable from untrusted networks (such as the internet), the vulnerability can be remotely exploitable at scale; if it is restricted to an internal LAN, attackers would need local network access or a prior foothold.

Public advisories may vary on authentication requirements, but the core risk exists whenever an attacker can cause the vulnerable CGI handler to process crafted parameters. If authentication is required and properly enforced, attackers must first obtain or bypass those credentials; if misconfigured, some deployments may expose the endpoint without strong authentication.

The most robust fix is to eliminate shell-based command construction in web handlers entirely and instead use safe, parameterized APIs or system calls. Alongside this, enforce strict validation for every input parameter (e.g., treat enable as a boolean with a limited, validated set of values) so that even if a command boundary exists, it cannot be influenced by arbitrary user strings.

Prevention relies on secure coding patterns at OS boundaries: avoid invoking a shell where possible, never concatenate untrusted input into command strings, enforce canonicalization and whitelisting for configuration parameters, and require security-focused code review and static analysis checks for any code paths that interact with the operating system or external tools.

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