Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Path Traversal in Tenda i6 HTTP Security Handler

CVE-2026-6024

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Unauthorized File System Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

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Summary

A path traversal vulnerability in the Tenda i6 router's HTTP handler (R7WebsSecurityHandlerfunction) allows remote manipulation of file paths processed by the device's web interface.

When specially crafted requests are sent to the affected handler, an attacker may access or interact with files outside the intended web directory, potentially exposing sensitive information or weakening device security controls.

Affected context

This issue occurs in the Tenda i6 firmware version 1.0.0.7(2204) within the HTTP handling logic responsible for security-related web requests.

The vulnerability is present when user-controlled path parameters are processed without sufficient normalization or restriction, allowing directory traversal sequences to influence which files or resources are accessed on the router's filesystem.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Exposed HTTP management interface of the Tenda i6 router
  • Required access: Network-level ability to send HTTP requests to the device (e.g., LAN access, or WAN if remote administration is exposed)
  • Trigger point: Invocation of the R7WebsSecurityHandlerfunction via crafted HTTP requests containing traversal patterns in path or parameter fields
  • Why exploitation is possible: The handler trusts and uses user-supplied path components without fully canonicalizing, sanitizing, and constraining them to an allowed directory, enabling directory traversal outside the intended web root

Why this happens

The underlying bug aligns with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').

The HTTP handler responsible for security-related requests appears to incorporate user-controlled input into filesystem paths or resource lookups without enforcing strict directory boundaries.

This insecure pattern emerges when input is concatenated or directly mapped to file system locations without:

  • Normalizing the resulting path
  • Rejecting traversal tokens such as ../
  • Enforcing a fixed, whitelisted base directory

As a result, attackers can traverse the directory structure and reach files that were never intended to be exposed via the web interface.

Potential impact

  • Access to configuration files that may reveal Wi‑Fi credentials, admin passwords (if weakly protected), or network settings
  • Exposure of system logs that could aid further attacks or device fingerprinting
  • Access to internal scripts or resources that may facilitate secondary vulnerabilities
  • Partial bypass of intended security controls around the router's management interface
  • Potential modification of writable files if the handler supports write operations, which could lead to persistent configuration tampering

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on constraining how paths are constructed and validated within HTTP handlers:

  • Treat all path segments and filename parameters as untrusted input and avoid direct concatenation into filesystem paths.
  • Normalize and canonicalize requested paths before use, then verify they remain under a predefined, fixed base directory.
  • Explicitly reject directory traversal patterns (e.g., .., encoded traversal sequences) and unexpected path separators.
  • Prefer whitelisting of allowed resources or routes rather than dynamically mapping arbitrary paths.
  • Run the HTTP service under a dedicated, least-privileged account with access only to the minimal set of files needed for operation, reducing impact even if traversal occurs.
  • Where feasible, separate static assets from sensitive configuration storage so that no web-exposed handler can reach critical files.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations and researchers can detect similar issues using a combination of analysis and testing:

  • Static analysis: Search for code paths where user input (query parameters, URL segments, form fields) is used in file operations (open/read/write/stat) without prior normalization and boundary checks.
  • Code review: Examine HTTP handlers for patterns like direct string concatenation into paths, missing canonicalization, or lack of checks against a known safe root directory.
  • Dynamic testing: Use web security scanners or manual tests to send requests with ../ and encoded traversal sequences in path and parameter values, monitoring for access to unexpected files.
  • Policy enforcement: Adopt secure coding guidelines for embedded web interfaces that mandate centralized path normalization utilities and disallow ad‑hoc file access from HTTP handlers.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Litengzheng/vuldb_new/blob/main/M3/vul_84/README.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/791826
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/356600
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/356600/cti
tenda.com.cntenda.com.cn/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, but only if the router's HTTP management interface is exposed beyond the local network (e.g., remote administration enabled or misconfigured port forwarding). Otherwise, exploitation is typically limited to attackers with local network access.

The attacker needs the ability to send HTTP requests to the Tenda i6 management interface. No prior authentication may be required if the vulnerable handler is reachable before login or if access controls are weak.

Implement strict path handling: canonicalize user-supplied paths, enforce that all resolved paths stay under a predefined base directory, reject traversal patterns, and prefer whitelisted resource access instead of dynamic file resolution.

Adopt a design where HTTP endpoints map to logical resources rather than direct filesystem paths, centralize path validation and normalization logic, use least-privilege file access for web processes, and include automated static and dynamic security testing focused on path usage in every development cycle.

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