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CVE-2026-60007

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

Padding Oracle (CWE-204) in Eclipse Milo Authentication

CVE-2026-60007

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Observable Error Discrepancy

CWE:

CWE-204

Impact:

Credential Disclosure and Account Takeover

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Eclipse Milo produces distinguishable errors when processing username tokens encrypted with RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, allowing an on-path attacker to use those differences as a padding oracle. If the attacker can capture a victim's encrypted token and send repeated unauthenticated session requests, the victim's password may be recovered and used for authentication.

Affected context

The issue can arise in Eclipse Milo deployments using username-token authentication with the Basic128Rsa15 security policy and affected versions that expose different responses for padding failures and other authentication errors. Exploitation depends on an attacker being positioned to observe or capture encrypted authentication traffic and interact with the OPC UA endpoint.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: OPC UA session activation and username-token authentication
  • Required access: Ability to observe a victim's encrypted username token and send unauthenticated requests to the target endpoint
  • Trigger point: Repeated ActivateSession requests containing modified authentication data
  • Why exploitation is possible: Distinguishable authentication errors reveal information about RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding validity, enabling oracle-based password recovery

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an observable discrepancy in authentication error handling. When invalid RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 padding produces a response that differs from other authentication failures, an attacker can use the endpoint's behavior as a decryption oracle. This maps to CWE-204 because security-relevant information is disclosed through differences in externally observable responses.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may recover a victim's password
  • Compromised credentials could enable unauthorized OPC UA authentication
  • Attackers could access or modify resources available to the victim account
  • Credential compromise could support further intrusion or operational disruption

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on making authentication failures indistinguishable and reducing reliance on legacy cryptographic constructions. Common defensive patterns include using uniform error responses and timing behavior, avoiding padding-oracle-prone encryption modes where secure alternatives are available, limiting unauthenticated session attempts, and applying account lockout or rate controls carefully to reduce abuse. Strong credential protection, least-privilege OPC UA identities, and encrypted authenticated transport can further reduce exposure.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can include code review and static analysis for authentication paths that return different errors based on decryption or padding state. Monitor repeated unauthenticated ActivateSession requests, unusual authentication failure patterns, response discrepancies, and traffic originating from unexpected network positions. Security policies can require uniform failure handling and prohibit legacy oracle-prone cryptographic modes; automated review tools may help identify inconsistent exception mapping.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/eclipse-milo/milo/commit/db59fae993a3a1bc66fffc8a2796d444b40285fb
gitlab.eclipse.orggitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/work_items/183
gitlab.eclipse.orggitlab.eclipse.org/security/vulnerability-reports/-/work_items/598

Frequently asked

questions

It can be exploitable over the network when an attacker can capture the

victim's encrypted username token and submit repeated requests to the

affected OPC UA endpoint.

No valid credentials are required to query the authentication behavior, but

the attacker generally needs an on-path position or another way to obtain the

victim's encrypted token.

Make all authentication and decryption failures externally indistinguishable,

restrict repeated unauthenticated attempts, and prefer secure cryptographic

mechanisms that do not expose padding-oracle behavior.

Review error and timing behavior in security-sensitive protocols, test

authentication endpoints for distinguishable responses, avoid legacy

cryptographic modes where practical, and enforce least privilege for service

identities.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.