Summary
ConvertX uses an HTTP GET endpoint to permanently delete conversion jobs without requiring a CSRF token. If an authenticated user visits attacker-controlled content, the browser may send the user's session cookie with a forged deletion request, causing unauthorized loss of converted-file history.
ConvertX uses an HTTP GET endpoint to permanently delete conversion jobs without requiring a CSRF token. If an authenticated user visits attacker-controlled content, the browser may send the user's session cookie with a forged deletion request, causing unauthorized loss of converted-file history.
Affected context
The issue affects ConvertX deployments where the job-deletion endpoint accepts state-changing requests through HTTP GET and does not verify CSRF protections. Risk is present when an authenticated user's browser can access attacker-controlled pages or content while the user's ConvertX session remains active.
The issue affects ConvertX deployments where the job-deletion endpoint accepts state-changing requests through HTTP GET and does not verify CSRF protections. Risk is present when an authenticated user's browser can access attacker-controlled pages or content while the user's ConvertX session remains active.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The web application's job-deletion endpoint
- Required access: An authenticated user's active browser session; the attacker does not necessarily need direct API credentials
- Trigger point: A cross-site request targeting the deletion route
- Why exploitation is possible: Browsers may automatically attach session cookies to qualifying requests, while the endpoint performs a permanent state-changing action without validating request origin or a CSRF token
- Attack surface: The web application's job-deletion endpoint
- Required access: An authenticated user's active browser session; the attacker does not necessarily need direct API credentials
- Trigger point: A cross-site request targeting the deletion route
- Why exploitation is possible: Browsers may automatically attach session cookies to qualifying requests, while the endpoint performs a permanent state-changing action without validating request origin or a CSRF token
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is a state-changing operation exposed through HTTP GET without cross-site request forgery defenses. Because the endpoint relies on ambient browser authentication and does not require an unpredictable, request-bound authorization value, attacker-controlled content may cause a victim's browser to submit an authenticated deletion request. This behavior maps to CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF).
The underlying flaw is a state-changing operation exposed through HTTP GET without cross-site request forgery defenses. Because the endpoint relies on ambient browser authentication and does not require an unpredictable, request-bound authorization value, attacker-controlled content may cause a victim's browser to submit an authenticated deletion request. This behavior maps to CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF).
Potential impact
- An attacker may delete a victim's converted-file history
- Users could lose access to records associated with completed conversion jobs
- Automated or repeated requests could cause broader data loss
- Operational workflows may be disrupted by unauthorized job removal
- An attacker may delete a victim's converted-file history
- Users could lose access to records associated with completed conversion jobs
- Automated or repeated requests could cause broader data loss
- Operational workflows may be disrupted by unauthorized job removal
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on separating safe retrieval actions from state-changing operations and requiring explicit authorization for destructive requests.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use POST, DELETE, or another appropriate method for deletion rather than GET
- Require synchronizer tokens or equivalent request-bound CSRF protections
- Validate request origin or referer signals as a defense-in-depth measure
- Configure session cookies with appropriate SameSite, Secure, and HttpOnly attributes
- Require explicit confirmation for permanent deletion where appropriate
- Apply least privilege to deletion capabilities and limit the scope of authenticated sessions
- Avoid relying solely on ambient cookies to authorize destructive actions
Mitigation generally focuses on separating safe retrieval actions from state-changing operations and requiring explicit authorization for destructive requests.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use POST, DELETE, or another appropriate method for deletion rather than GET
- Require synchronizer tokens or equivalent request-bound CSRF protections
- Validate request origin or referer signals as a defense-in-depth measure
- Configure session cookies with appropriate SameSite, Secure, and HttpOnly attributes
- Require explicit confirmation for permanent deletion where appropriate
- Apply least privilege to deletion capabilities and limit the scope of authenticated sessions
- Avoid relying solely on ambient cookies to authorize destructive actions
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar issues through:
- Static analysis rules that flag state-changing behavior in GET handlers
- Code review checks for missing CSRF middleware or token validation on destructive routes
- API policy enforcement that prohibits unsafe actions through safe HTTP methods
- Dynamic testing that submits cross-origin requests while an authenticated session is active
- Monitoring for unusual deletion patterns, including requests with unexpected origins or high deletion volumes
Automated security review tools may help identify endpoints that mutate server state without explicit request authorization.
Organizations can identify similar issues through:
- Static analysis rules that flag state-changing behavior in GET handlers
- Code review checks for missing CSRF middleware or token validation on destructive routes
- API policy enforcement that prohibits unsafe actions through safe HTTP methods
- Dynamic testing that submits cross-origin requests while an authenticated session is active
- Monitoring for unusual deletion patterns, including requests with unexpected origins or high deletion volumes
Automated security review tools may help identify endpoints that mutate server state without explicit request authorization.
