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CVE-2026-59960

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

OS Command Injection (CWE-78) in Argos SDK CI Runner

CVE-2026-59960

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Arbitrary command execution and CI runner compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

CVE-2026-59960 is a high-severity OS command injection vulnerability in Argos JavaScript's CI integration. When attacker-controlled pull-request branch or ref values reach shell commands during the Argos upload process, an attacker may execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the CI runner.

Affected context

The vulnerability can occur in Argos JavaScript CI environments that derive branch or ref values from sources such as GITHUB_HEAD_REF or ARGOS_BRANCH. Risk is present when these values flow through config.branch and merge-base processing into Git commands executed through a shell, particularly when remote content access is disabled.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Argos JavaScript's CI upload and Git integration
  • Required access: Ability to influence a pull-request branch name or related CI ref value
  • Trigger point: Git fetch or merge-base processing during the Argos upload workflow
  • Why exploitation is possible: Attacker-controlled values are interpolated into command strings executed by /bin/sh -c, allowing shell metacharacters to alter command interpretation

Why this happens

The underlying bug is command construction from untrusted branch or ref data. The gitFetch() and gitMergeBase() functions place attacker-controlled values directly into strings passed to execSync(), which invokes a shell.

This maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command. The insecure pattern occurs when data intended as a Git argument is treated as part of shell syntax rather than as a separately validated argument.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute arbitrary commands on the CI runner
  • CI secrets and tokens could be exposed
  • Build artifacts may be modified or replaced
  • Source code, test data, or generated outputs could be altered
  • The runner may be used for lateral movement or further environment compromise

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that branch and ref values remain data throughout command execution.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Use process-spawning APIs that pass arguments separately without invoking a shell
  • Avoid string interpolation when constructing Git or other operating-system commands
  • Apply strict validation and allowlisting to branch and ref values
  • Treat all pull-request metadata and CI environment variables as untrusted input
  • Apply least privilege to CI tokens, workers, and filesystem access
  • Isolate upload jobs and restrict access to secrets based on workflow trust
  • Use defensive CI policies for untrusted pull requests and forked repositories

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify similar issues through:

  • Static analysis rules for interpolated values passed to execSync(), shell evaluators, or command-string APIs
  • Code review checks for CI metadata flowing into shell commands
  • Searches for /bin/sh -c, command concatenation, template literals, and unvalidated Git arguments
  • CI policy enforcement that restricts secret exposure in workflows processing untrusted branches
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, outbound connections, or modified build outputs from upload jobs

Automated code review and software composition analysis tools may help detect unsafe command construction patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/argos-ci/argos-javascript/commit/8355f3af3be3f4fe361d58a688d21535cf672717
github.comgithub.com/argos-ci/argos-javascript/pull/319
github.comgithub.com/argos-ci/argos-javascript/releases/tag/@argos-ci/core@6.2.1
github.comgithub.com/argos-ci/argos-javascript/security/advisories/GHSA-4x45-gxvp-6283

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation is generally indirect. An attacker may need to influence a pull-request branch or ref value that is processed by an Argos CI workflow.

Direct runner access is not necessarily required. The relevant prerequisite is the ability to provide metadata that reaches the vulnerable command-building path.

Avoid shell-based command construction and pass Git arguments through APIs that do not interpret input as shell syntax. Validate values according to a strict expected format.

Treat CI metadata as untrusted, minimize secrets and runner privileges, isolate workflows handling external contributions, and enforce static analysis and code-review policies for shell command usage.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.