Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

OS Command Injection in Totolink A7100RU CGI Handler

CVE-2026-5978

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Network Device

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Totolink A7100RU routers contain an OS command injection flaw in the CGI handler setWiFiAclRules, where the mode argument is passed unsafely to the underlying system.

A remote attacker can send crafted HTTP requests to inject arbitrary shell commands, potentially gaining full control over the device.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects Totolink A7100RU firmware 7.4cu.2313_b20191024 in environments where:

  • The web management interface (HTTP/CGI) is reachable over the network (LAN or WAN, depending on configuration).
  • The /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi endpoint is exposed and processes the setWiFiAclRules action.
  • User-supplied parameters, including mode, are passed to system-level commands without sufficient validation or sanitization.

It becomes most critical when the router's admin interface is accessible from untrusted networks or the credentials are weak or reused.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface of the Totolink A7100RU router, specifically the /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi CGI handler.
  • Required access: Network-level ability to reach the web interface; authentication requirements depend on the specific handler and deployment configuration.
  • Trigger point: Invocation of the setWiFiAclRules function with a crafted mode argument in an HTTP request.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The mode parameter is incorporated into a shell or system command without adequate input validation, escaping, or use of parameterized APIs, allowing attacker-controlled content to be interpreted as executable shell syntax.

Why this happens

The root cause is an OS command injection flaw consistent with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection').

The CGI handler setWiFiAclRules appears to build or invoke OS-level commands using untrusted HTTP parameters such as mode. Instead of treating user input as data only, the code allows shell metacharacters or command fragments to pass through to the operating system.

This pattern typically arises from using generic system call wrappers (e.g., system, popen, exec with a shell) combined with string concatenation, without strict validation, whitelisting, or argument separation. As a result, attackers can break out of the intended command context and execute arbitrary commands on the underlying router OS.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary commands on the router.
  • Complete device takeover, including persistent malware installation.
  • Modification of routing, DNS, or firewall rules to intercept or redirect traffic.
  • Extraction of configuration data, including Wi-Fi passwords and administrative credentials.
  • Use of the compromised router as a platform for further attacks on internal or external targets (botnet activity, DDoS, scanning).
  • Disruption of network connectivity for connected clients.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on avoiding direct shell invocation with untrusted data and narrowing the trust boundary of configuration endpoints:

  • Prefer APIs that do not involve a shell, using system calls with explicit argument vectors instead of command-line strings.
  • Enforce strict input validation for parameters like mode using whitelists of allowed values and rejecting anything outside a known-safe set.
  • Apply robust escaping and normalization when interaction with the shell is unavoidable, ensuring that metacharacters cannot alter command structure.
  • Design CGI handlers to operate with least privilege, limiting filesystem and network capabilities of the web process.
  • Restrict network exposure of the management interface (e.g., disable WAN management, use separate management VLAN, and strong authentication).
  • Adopt secure-by-default configurations that disable or lock down sensitive configuration actions unless explicitly needed.

How teams detect issues like this

Identifying this and similar issues usually involves a combination of code-level and behavioral analysis:

  • Static analysis: Configure security linters or SAST tools to flag string-concatenated calls to system, popen, or equivalent APIs where user input (such as CGI parameters) flows into command arguments.
  • Code review: During manual review, look for:
  • Direct use of HTTP/CGI parameters in shell commands.
  • Absence of input validation or whitelisting around configuration actions like setWiFiAclRules.
  • Shell metacharacters not being filtered or neutralized.
  • Dynamic analysis: Use web application security scanners or custom fuzzers to send crafted inputs containing shell metacharacters (;, &&, |, backticks) and monitor for anomalous behavior, log entries, or outbound connections.
  • Runtime monitoring: Deploy logging and IDS/IPS rules to detect suspicious command patterns originating from router web processes, and alert on abnormal process executions or unexpected network traffic from the device.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Litengzheng/vuldb_new/blob/main/A7100RU/vul_164/README.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/791825
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/356532
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/356532/cti
totolink.nettotolink.net/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if the router's web management interface is exposed to the internet or reachable from an attacker-controlled network segment. If the interface is limited to a private LAN, attackers must first gain access to that network.

That depends on how the vulnerable CGI handler is integrated and protected. In some deployments, command injection points have historically been reachable either without authentication or with weak, reused credentials. Where authentication is enforced correctly, an attacker would need those credentials or another way to bypass authentication.

The strongest fix is to remove shell-based command construction entirely for configuration routines and instead call lower-level APIs with fixed argument lists. Combine this with strict whitelisting of parameter values and comprehensive validation at trust boundaries.

Establish development practices that prohibit direct use of untrusted input in shell commands, adopt secure coding guidelines for embedded web interfaces, integrate SAST and security code review into the firmware build process, and maintain security testing (including fuzzing and penetration testing) as part of each release cycle.

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