/

CVE-2026-59726

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(10.0)

Authless MCP Bridge Command Exec (CWE-306) in Ruflo

CVE-2026-59726

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication / Broken Access Control

CWE:

CWE-78, CWE-306, CWE-942

Impact:

Remote Code Execution and Data Integrity Compromise

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(10.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Ruflo's default docker-compose deployment previously exposed MCP bridge endpoints without any authentication or access control.

An unauthenticated network attacker could invoke terminal execution tools through these endpoints to obtain a shell in the bridge container, access provider API keys, and tamper with AgentDB learning-store patterns in vulnerable deployments.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Ruflo deployments that rely on the default docker-compose configuration where the MCP bridge /mcp and /mcp/:group HTTP endpoints are bound to a network interface without protection.

It becomes relevant when the bridge container is reachable over a network segment accessible to untrusted or semi-trusted users, and no external reverse proxy, firewall, or authentication layer is placed in front of these endpoints.

Environments exposing these endpoints on shared development networks, internal corporate networks, or misconfigured production clusters are particularly at risk.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP-based MCP bridge API (POST /mcp and POST /mcp/:group) exposed from the Ruflo bridge container.
  • Required access: Network connectivity to the bridge's listening port; no prior authentication or credentials are required in the default vulnerable configuration.
  • Trigger point: Sending crafted MCP requests that invoke tools/call operations targeting capabilities like terminal_execute or other privileged tools.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The endpoints lack authentication and authorization checks (CWE-306), and the bridge allows high-privilege tool invocation via these endpoints, enabling command execution in the container and interaction with sensitive runtime state.

Why this happens

The core issue stems from exposing a high-privilege automation and tooling interface (the MCP bridge) without enforcing authentication or authorization, aligning with CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.

This insecure design is compounded by allowing tool invocations that map directly to OS-level command execution (related to CWE-78: OS Command Injection) without limiting who can call them or what commands they can issue.

Additionally, the environment trusts the runtime context and stored data—such as AgentDB learning-store patterns and provider API keys—without segregating control-plane interfaces from data-plane networks, reflecting a broader CWE-942: Permissive Cross-Domain Security Policy style misconfiguration where cross-boundary access to sensitive capabilities is not appropriately constrained.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute arbitrary commands inside the MCP bridge container, effectively gaining a remote shell.
  • An attacker could access and exfiltrate provider API keys and other secrets stored in the bridge environment.
  • An attacker may poison AgentDB learning-store patterns, degrading or manipulating future agent behavior and recommendations.
  • An attacker could pivot from the bridge container to other internal services or infrastructure, depending on network configuration and credentials present.
  • An attacker may cause denial of service by exhausting resources, corrupting configuration, or disrupting automation workflows.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on constraining access to the MCP bridge and reducing the privileges of exposed interfaces:

  • Introduce mandatory authentication and authorization for all MCP-related HTTP endpoints, ensuring only trusted callers can invoke high-privilege tools.
  • Place the bridge behind a reverse proxy or API gateway that enforces authentication, rate limiting, and network-level access controls.
  • Restrict network exposure by binding the bridge service to localhost or an internal network segment and using VPNs or bastion hosts for remote access.
  • Apply least-privilege to the terminal execution and similar tools, limiting available commands, directories, and environment visibility where possible.
  • Segregate secrets and sensitive configuration from the runtime container, using dedicated secret stores and restricting the filesystem paths accessible to tools.
  • Implement environment hardening for the bridge container, including non-root execution, minimized capabilities, and restrictive file permissions for any persistent state such as AgentDB.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can leverage both configuration review and runtime monitoring:

  • Use static configuration analysis to flag docker-compose or deployment manifests that expose MCP bridge endpoints on external interfaces or without authentication.
  • Integrate policy-as-code tools (e.g., for Docker, Kubernetes, or infrastructure-as-code) to enforce rules such as "no critical management endpoints without auth" or "no direct exposure of agent tooling APIs to public networks."
  • During code review, highlight any HTTP handlers or controller routes that invoke high-privilege tools (like terminal execution) and verify they are consistently guarded by auth and authorization checks.
  • Employ logging and audit trails for MCP requests, including caller identity, invoked tools, and parameters, and feed these logs into SIEM systems for anomaly detection.
  • Use container runtime monitoring to detect unusual command executions, access to sensitive files (such as API key locations), or unexpected modifications to AgentDB learning-store data.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/ruvnet/ruflo/commit/d00a0a40cd8bdbca877ac7f675f416bdc69accd1
github.comgithub.com/ruvnet/ruflo/pull/2521
github.comgithub.com/ruvnet/ruflo/releases/tag/v3.16.3
github.comgithub.com/ruvnet/ruflo/security/advisories/GHSA-c4hm-4h84-2cf3

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the MCP bridge endpoints are reachable over the network segment from an attacker's location, they can send unauthenticated HTTP requests to exploit the issue. In default vulnerable configurations, no credentials are required, so any host with network access to the bridge port may attempt exploitation.

The attacker only needs network connectivity to the exposed MCP bridge port. They do not require a Ruflo account, API token, or operating system credentials. However, in deployments where the bridge is constrained to an internal network segment or protected by external controls, the attacker would first need to compromise an entity with access to that segment.

The most robust fix pattern is to require strong authentication and authorization for all management and tooling endpoints, ensure they are not directly exposed to untrusted networks, and strictly control which tools can be invoked and by whom. This typically involves combining application-level auth checks, network segmentation, and least-privilege configurations for command-executing tools.

Prevention strategies include designing with "secure-by-default" principles—ensuring critical interfaces are never exposed unauthenticated, using infrastructure-as-code policies to block such exposures, and implementing threat modeling for agent and automation components. Regular configuration reviews, automated checks in CI/CD pipelines, and adherence to least-privilege and network segmentation best practices help ensure that any new management or bridge interfaces are appropriately protected before deployment.

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