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CVE-2026-59706

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.3)

Missing Auth (CWE-306) in mem0 Config and LLM API

CVE-2026-59706

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Secret Exposure and Server-Side Request Forgery

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

mem0 exposes configuration APIs without authentication, leaking stored LLM API keys in plaintext and allowing server-side request forgery via a user-controlled base URL parameter.

When these endpoints are reachable from untrusted networks, an attacker can both exfiltrate secrets and coerce the server into making arbitrary HTTP requests to internal services.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in deployments of mem0 where configuration endpoints are network-accessible without an explicit authentication or authorization layer.

It is most impactful when mem0 runs in environments that store LLM-related secrets (such as OpenAI API keys) and has outbound network access to internal or cloud metadata services.

Risk increases when the service is exposed directly to the internet or shared within multi-tenant infrastructure.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP config API endpoints such as:
  • GET /api/v1/config/
  • PUT /api/v1/config/mem0/llm
  • Required access: Network reachability to the mem0 service; no valid credentials or user accounts are required.
  • Trigger point: Sending unauthenticated requests to read configuration or set ollama_base_url to attacker-chosen addresses.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application does not enforce authentication/authorization on sensitive configuration operations and accepts unvalidated URLs that the server later uses for outbound requests.

Why this happens

The core issue is the absence of authentication and authorization controls on sensitive configuration APIs.

According to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function, critical operations such as reading secrets and updating network parameters are exposed as public endpoints.

Additionally, the design trusts user-supplied values for ollama_base_url without constraining where the server can connect, creating a server-side request forgery channel.

Together, these patterns allow unauthenticated attackers to both retrieve secrets and drive the server to make arbitrary internal HTTP calls.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may retrieve plaintext OpenAI and other LLM provider API keys.
  • Secrets can be reused to impersonate the application, consume LLM quotas, or access sensitive data processed by upstream AI services.
  • SSRF via ollama_base_url can be used to query internal HTTP services, including cloud instance metadata endpoints.
  • Internal network reconnaissance and possible pivoting to other services reachable from the mem0 host.
  • Regulatory and compliance impact due to unauthorized access to secrets and potential data exposure.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation should focus on enforcing strong access control and reducing trust in user-controlled configuration values.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Treating configuration APIs as privileged operations gated by authentication and role-based authorization.
  • Separating read-only status endpoints from any interface that exposes secrets or modifies network settings.
  • Avoiding storage and direct exposure of secrets in plaintext within API responses; use secret managers and masked representations.
  • Constraining outbound connection targets in configuration parameters (e.g., allow-listed domains or strict URL validation) to avoid arbitrary SSRF.
  • Applying network-layer controls such as API gateways, firewalls, and service meshes to limit who can reach internal admin/config endpoints.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines configuration review with code-level analysis.

Useful approaches include:

  • Static analysis or manual review to flag routes that handle secrets or network parameters but lack authentication and authorization middleware.
  • API gateway or load balancer policies that identify publicly exposed endpoints returning sensitive configuration data.
  • Logging and monitoring of configuration access patterns, including unauthenticated requests to /api/v1/config/ and unusual changes to ollama_base_url.
  • Periodic security testing and SSRF-focused assessments that attempt to drive outbound requests to internal services via configuration APIs.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/mem0ai/mem0
github.comgithub.com/mem0ai/mem0/commit/a3154d59e52386d4e1189c1f5f44819868f76514
github.comgithub.com/mem0ai/mem0/issues/6081
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/mem0-server-side-request-forgery-and-plaintext-api-key-exposure-via-unauthenticated-config-endpoints

Frequently asked

questions

It is broadly exploitable wherever mem0's configuration endpoints are reachable from untrusted networks, because no authentication is required and the operations directly expose secrets and SSRF capabilities.

Only network access to the mem0 service is required; an attacker does not need valid credentials, a user account, or prior foothold inside the environment.

Introduce robust authentication and authorization for all configuration and admin endpoints, remove plaintext secret exposure from responses, and strictly limit which URLs configuration parameters can drive the server to contact.

Design admin and configuration surfaces under an explicit security model: require authentication, apply least-privilege roles, avoid returning raw secrets, enforce URL/host allow-lists, and integrate automated reviews that flag unauthenticated critical functions and SSRF-prone parameters.

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