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CVE-2026-59258

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

Broken Access Control (CWE-863) in Immich Album Roles

CVE-2026-59258

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Access Control

CWE:

CWE-863

Impact:

Privilege Escalation to Full Album Ownership

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Immich contains a broken access control issue in the album membership update endpoint that lets non-owner editors change user roles without proper owner-only restrictions.

An attacker with editor access to a shared album can demote the current owner and promote themselves to owner over sequential requests, ultimately gaining full control over the album and its membership.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in Immich deployments that expose the PUT /albums/:id/user/:userId endpoint for managing album membership and roles.

It is relevant when shared albums have multiple members with editor permissions and the backend does not enforce strict role-based constraints on who can modify ownership or change member privileges.

The issue is most pronounced in collaborative or family/shared photo library scenarios where editors are expected to have limited rights compared to owners but still retain access to album management APIs.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP API endpoint PUT /albums/:id/user/:userId within the Immich backend.
  • Required access: Valid authenticated user with editor-level access to a shared album where another user is designated as owner.
  • Trigger point: Sending crafted role-change requests targeting album members, including the current owner, to modify their role assignments.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The access control logic fails to enforce that only the album owner (or a higher-privileged role) can modify ownership-related fields, allowing editors to perform role changes that should be restricted.

Why this happens

The root cause is insufficient authorization checks on a sensitive role-management endpoint, mapping directly to CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization.

The backend treats editor-level users as authorized to modify album member roles, including ownership changes, without differentiating between operations that should be owner-only and those that editors may legitimately perform.

Abstractly, this reflects a pattern where a generic "can edit album" permission is reused for privileged operations such as demoting owners and promoting other accounts, rather than implementing granular checks tied to the specific action being performed.

Potential impact

  • An editor can promote their own account to album owner and demote or evict the original owner.
  • Attackers may gain full control over shared album content, including deletion of photos and metadata.
  • Legitimate owners could lose visibility or access to their albums if removed or downgraded.
  • In multi-tenant or shared environments, this could facilitate social engineering or account takeover scenarios centered around content control.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on reinforcing authorization boundaries around role changes and ownership management.

Typical defensive patterns include:

  • Implementing explicit authorization checks that restrict ownership and role modification actions to the current album owner or an application-wide administrator role.
  • Separating "content editing" permissions from "membership and role management" permissions, ensuring editors cannot alter privileged roles.
  • Validating requested role transitions against a server-side policy that disallows demoting the sole owner or promotes only under controlled conditions.
  • Logging and auditing ownership changes to help detect anomalous role transitions and support rollback mechanisms.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection generally involves both preventive and retrospective techniques:

  • Static or unit tests asserting that only owner or admin roles can invoke role-changing logic in the album membership controller or service layer.
  • Code reviews focused on authorization middleware usage and ensuring that role-management routes require stronger privileges than content editing routes.
  • Policy-based checks that flag endpoints modifying role, owner, or membership state where authorization guards are weak, missing, or reused from lower-privilege actions.
  • Runtime monitoring and audit trails for sudden ownership flips, especially when executed by non-owner accounts, allowing security teams to investigate and remediate misuse.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/immich-app/immich/commit/84dff19ca9a467752d848ff54763d62c04ebf960
github.comgithub.com/immich-app/immich/issues/29857
github.comgithub.com/immich-app/immich/pull/29883
github.comgithub.com/immich-app/immich/releases/tag/v3.0.3
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/immich-shared-album-editor-ownership-takeover-via-updateuser

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the Immich instance is exposed over the internet and an attacker has editor access to a shared album, they can issue crafted HTTP requests to exploit the role-change logic without needing local access.

The attacker must be an authenticated user with editor-level rights on a shared album. They cannot exploit this flaw without being a member of the album, but once they are an editor, they can escalate to owner.

Enforce strict role-based authorization on privileged endpoints, ensuring that only owners or administrators can change ownership, modify member roles, or evict members, and codify these rules in centralized authorization checks rather than per-endpoint ad hoc logic.

Adopt a consistent access control model with clearly defined permissions for each role, apply them through shared middleware or policy engines, add tests around sensitive actions such as role changes or deletions, and regularly review authorization boundaries during code reviews and security testing.

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