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CVE-2026-59255

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Missing Authorization (CWE-862) in BloodHound API

CVE-2026-59255

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Privilege Escalation and Global Data Tampering

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

BloodHound's custom-nodes API endpoints lack proper authorization checks, allowing any authenticated user to modify the global graph schema.

Attackers with valid session tokens can create, update, or delete custom node types affecting all users and tenants, making deployments risky in multi-user or multi-tenant environments.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in BloodHound deployments that expose the custom-nodes API and rely on role-based or tenant-based separation of graph data.

It becomes relevant when:

  • Multiple users or tenants share the same BloodHound instance
  • Any authenticated account can obtain a valid session token
  • The global graph schema is expected to be governed by privileged roles or administrators only

In such environments, lack of authorization on schema-changing endpoints enables broad, unintended control over shared graph structures.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: BloodHound custom-nodes API endpoints (POST, PUT, DELETE)
  • Required access: Any authenticated user with a valid session token to the application
  • Trigger point: Invoking unprotected schema modification operations on custom-nodes endpoints
  • Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks are missing on these endpoints, so the backend does not verify whether the caller is permitted to alter global graph schema or cross-tenant node types.

Why this happens

The underlying bug class is missing authorization enforcement on sensitive operations.

The custom-nodes endpoints correctly require authentication but fail to perform a second, critical step: verifying whether the authenticated principal has the necessary privileges to change global schema elements.

This maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, where security-critical actions are exposed without appropriate permission checks, leading to unintended access to administrative or cross-tenant functionality.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may redefine or corrupt global graph schema used by all users
  • Malicious custom node types could mislead security investigations and risk assessments
  • Cross-tenant data interference can occur in shared environments
  • Privilege escalation via manipulation of relationships and node semantics may be enabled
  • Operational disruption and loss of trust in BloodHound reporting and analytics

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing fine-grained authorization for schema-changing operations and reducing the blast radius of authenticated but low-privilege accounts.

Useful patterns include:

  • Applying role-based access control (RBAC) to custom-nodes endpoints so only administrative roles can modify global schema
  • Explicitly checking ownership and tenant context for operations that alter shared data structures
  • Centralizing authorization logic rather than duplicating ad-hoc permission checks across handlers
  • Designing schema-management APIs as privileged operations with separate administrative workflows
  • Minimizing default privileges for new user accounts and session tokens, following least-privilege principles

How teams detect issues like this

Detection often combines design review with runtime monitoring:

  • During code review, look for API handlers that authenticate users but lack explicit authorization checks or role validation, especially around schema, configuration, or cross-tenant operations
  • Use static analysis rules that flag endpoints performing create/update/delete operations on shared resources without corresponding permission validation calls
  • Implement audit logging on custom-nodes and similar administrative APIs, then monitor for unusual patterns, such as frequent schema changes from low-privilege accounts
  • Apply policy-based gateways or API firewalls that enforce access control policies even if backend handlers are incomplete
  • Leverage automated security testing tools to probe for administrative functions accessible to standard user roles

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/SpecterOps/BloodHound/commit/8f790351349fd87bcb04377aba84cba6495825b3
github.comgithub.com/SpecterOps/BloodHound/issues/2910
github.comgithub.com/SpecterOps/BloodHound/pull/2989
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/bloodhound-missing-authorization-on-custom-node-management-api

Frequently asked

questions

It is exploitable by any user who can successfully authenticate and obtain a valid session token to the BloodHound instance. In shared or multi-tenant deployments, this can affect all other users and tenants.

The attacker only needs authenticated user access—no special administrative role is required. Once logged in, they can invoke unprotected POST, PUT, and DELETE operations on the custom-nodes endpoints.

Implement strict authorization on all custom-nodes schema modification endpoints. Ensure that only explicitly privileged roles (such as administrators) can create, update, or delete global node types, and centralize permission checks in a common authorization layer.

Adopt a secure-by-design access control model where every state-changing or administrative endpoint must declare and enforce required roles or permissions. Combine this with systematic code review for access control, automated tests that verify unauthorized requests are rejected, and architectural patterns that separate standard user operations from administrative or cross-tenant functions.

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