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CVE-2026-59245

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Privilege Escalation (CWE-269) in Airflow FAB Auth

CVE-2026-59245

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Privilege Escalation

CWE:

CWE-269

Impact:

Unauthorized Access to All DAGs

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A permission mapping flaw in Apache Airflow's FAB auth manager causes a DAG named DAGs to collide with the global all-DAGs permission resource.

When per-DAG access is granted on this specific DAG, the user is silently given read and edit permissions across all DAGs, enabling unintended privilege escalation in environments using per-DAG access_control.

Affected context

This issue occurs in Apache Airflow deployments that:

  • Use the FAB auth manager and per-DAG access_control
  • Define a DAG whose dag_id is exactly DAGs
  • Rely on resource names generated by resource_name() for permission scoping

Under these conditions, the per-DAG permission for the DAGs DAG overlaps with the global all-DAGs resource, leading to broader access than intended for affected users.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Airflow web UI and API permission system
  • Required access: Ability of an administrator or permission manager to assign per-DAG access for a DAG named DAGs
  • Trigger point: Granting per-DAG access_control on the DAGs DAG using FAB auth
  • Why exploitation is possible: The resource_name() function produces an identical resource identifier for the global all-DAGs permission and for the specific DAG dag_id of DAGs, causing a collision that merges scoped and global permissions.

Why this happens

The underlying problem is an authorization design flaw where resource identifiers used for access control are not guaranteed to be unique between global and per-object scopes.

In this case, the Airflow FAB auth manager's resource_name() function generates the same resource name for the global "all DAGs" permission and for a specific DAG whose dag_id is DAGs, which maps to CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management.

Because the system cannot distinguish between the global and per-DAG resource, granting access to the DAGs DAG effectively assigns global DAG permissions, violating the intended access boundaries.

Potential impact

  • A lower-privileged user may gain read access to all DAG definitions
  • A user could edit, pause, or unpause any DAG in the environment
  • Unintended modification of production workflows can occur
  • Sensitive operational logic and configuration embedded in DAGs may be exposed

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on strengthening authorization boundaries and ensuring unambiguous resource identifiers.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Designing access-control resource names so that global and per-object scopes cannot collide (e.g., explicit namespacing or prefixing)
  • Validating that identifiers derived from user-controlled fields (like dag_id) cannot overlap with reserved or global resource names
  • Applying least-privilege principles when granting per-DAG access and reviewing existing assignments for unintended broad permissions
  • Introducing guardrails in permission-management workflows, such as warnings or checks when granting access to resources with special or reserved identifiers

How teams detect issues like this

High-level detection approaches include:

  • Reviewing Airflow permission mappings for cases where per-DAG access on a single DAG implicitly grants global DAG permissions
  • Inspecting configuration and audit logs for assignments of access_control to a DAG named DAGs and correlating them with effective permissions
  • Using policy checks or custom scripts to verify that resource identifiers used in authorization systems are unique and do not overlap with reserved global names
  • Incorporating static or configuration analysis in CI/CD pipelines to flag risky identifier patterns or ambiguous resource naming schemes

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/apache/airflow/pull/69106
lists.apache.orglists.apache.org/thread/70f37q3mwov1vm3zolrfxlzds278c78h
openwall.comopenwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/13/4

Frequently asked

questions

It primarily broadens access to existing DAGs. A user who gains global DAG permissions through this collision can read and modify DAGs according to the capabilities tied to that global permission, which may include editing DAG code but not necessarily administrative actions beyond that scope.

The issue is triggered when a lower-privileged user is deliberately granted per-DAG access to a DAG named DAGs. Typically, an administrator or role manager must assign that permission, so exploitation depends on how permissions are managed and whether such a DAG exists.

Use clearly namespaced and non-overlapping resource identifiers that distinguish global, per-object, and special-case permissions. Ensure that any identifier derived from user-defined names cannot conflict with reserved authorization resources.

Adopt a systematic authorization design that includes explicit scopes, reserved name handling, and automated checks for identifier collisions. Combine this with regular access-control reviews, least-privilege role design, and security testing focused on permission boundaries and resource naming semantics.

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