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CVE-2026-58660

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Broken Access Control (CWE-639) in Kanboard Tasks

CVE-2026-58660

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Access Control

CWE:

CWE-639

Impact:

Cross-Project Task Manipulation and Data Integrity Loss

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Kanboard up to version 1.2.52 contains a broken access control issue in the drag-and-drop board endpoint, allowing users to move tasks outside their authorized projects.

Because the application validates the user against an attacker-supplied project_id but never confirms that the task_id belongs to that project, any authenticated user can enumerate and rearrange tasks from other projects, including private ones, when the instance uses globally sequential task IDs.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in Kanboard instances where the BoardAjaxController save() method powers the kanban board drag-and-drop interface.

It becomes relevant when task identifiers are sequential across the entire instance and the endpoint relies solely on role checks for a caller-supplied project_id.

In such setups, any authenticated user with membership in at least one project may indirectly affect tasks in other projects if ownership validation between task_id and project_id is missing.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP API used by the kanban board drag-and-drop (BoardAjaxController save() endpoint)
  • Required access: Any authenticated Kanboard account with membership in at least one project
  • Trigger point: Sending a request that references a project the attacker can access while specifying a task_id that actually belongs to a different project
  • Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint verifies the user's role against the caller-supplied project_id but does not verify that the supplied task_id is owned by that project, and task IDs are globally sequential across the instance, enabling enumeration

Why this happens

The underlying bug is a form of broken access control where authorization checks are performed only on one resource attribute (project_id) and not on the related resource (task_id).

Concretely, the BoardAjaxController save() method ensures the caller has the appropriate role for the project they claim to be manipulating but fails to assert that the task being moved actually belongs to that project.

This pattern maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, where attackers exploit user-controlled identifiers to gain unauthorized access or influence over other objects in the system.

Potential impact

  • Authenticated users may move tasks belonging to other projects, including private projects
  • Tasks from sensitive projects could be hidden, misclassified, or effectively corrupted on the board view
  • Project workflows and reporting can be disrupted or manipulated
  • Incident response and audit trails may be complicated due to unexpected cross-project task movements

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strict ownership checks between related entities and reducing reliance on user-supplied identifiers for authorization decisions.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Validating that every task_id used in project-scoped operations is actually owned by the referenced project_id
  • Centralizing authorization checks so that object-level access rules are consistently applied across controllers and endpoints
  • Treating all client-controlled identifiers as untrusted and re-resolving them server-side before performing actions
  • Designing APIs so that operations are scoped by server-resolved resource relationships rather than by loosely coupled IDs from the client
  • Applying least-privilege design to ensure authenticated users can only manipulate tasks in projects they explicitly belong to

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves reviewing how identifiers are used in authorization logic and verifying that object ownership checks are enforced.

High-level strategies include:

  • Static analysis rules that flag uses of user-supplied IDs in access control decisions without corresponding ownership validation
  • Code review checklists that require verifying the relationship between primary resources (projects) and secondary resources (tasks) in each endpoint
  • Security-focused tests that attempt cross-project operations using valid credentials for one project and object IDs from another
  • Automated tooling or policies that enforce consistent use of authorization helpers for object-level checks across the codebase

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/kanboard/kanboard/commit/564cc30e1e360959572e01e158734d9475c05903
github.comgithub.com/kanboard/kanboard/issues/5852
github.comgithub.com/kanboard/kanboard/pull/5853
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/kanboard-boardajaxcontroller-missing-ownership-check-via-drag-and-drop

Frequently asked

questions

No. Exploitation requires an authenticated Kanboard account; however, the account only needs access to any single project to begin enumerating and manipulating tasks across other projects.

The attacker must be a member of at least one project on the instance. With that minimal access, they can craft requests that target task IDs belonging to other projects due to the lack of cross-checking between task and project ownership.

The most robust fix is to enforce object-level authorization by confirming that each task_id used in a project-scoped action belongs to the specified project and that the user is authorized for that task's actual project, rather than trusting client-supplied relationships.

Preventive strategies include centralizing authorization logic, treating all client-controlled identifiers as untrusted, writing tests for cross-object access scenarios, and adopting secure coding guidelines that emphasize strict ownership validation for every resource manipulation endpoint.

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