Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

OS Command Injection in Totolink A7100RU CGI Handler

CVE-2026-5852

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Router Firmware

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Totolink A7100RU routers contain an OS command injection flaw in the setIptvCfg handler within /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi, where the igmpVer parameter is improperly processed.

A remote attacker can send crafted HTTP requests that inject arbitrary system commands through this parameter, potentially taking full control of the device.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in the web-based management interface of Totolink A7100RU firmware version 7.4cu.2313_b20191024, specifically in the CGI handler responsible for IPTV configuration.

It manifests when the router exposes its HTTP management interface over the local network or internet, and the setIptvCfg function accepts user-controlled input for igmpVer that is later incorporated into system-level commands.

Actual exploitability depends on how the interface is published (WAN/LAN), whether authentication is required or weakly enforced, and any intermediary network protections.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface on the Totolink A7100RU router, via /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi.
  • Required access: Ability to reach the router's web interface over the network; exploitability may or may not require valid credentials depending on configuration.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted request that invokes setIptvCfg and supplies a malicious payload in the igmpVer parameter.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The igmpVer value is treated as trusted input and is concatenated into or passed directly to OS-level command execution APIs without robust validation, sanitization, or proper argument separation, enabling arbitrary command execution.

Why this happens

This issue is rooted in improper handling of user-supplied input that flows into system command execution on the router.

The setIptvCfg function processes the igmpVer parameter and ultimately uses it to build one or more shell commands, likely via APIs such as system(), popen(), or shell invocation with string concatenation.

Because the input is not strictly validated, quoted, or confined to an allow-listed set of values, attackers can embed shell metacharacters and additional commands.

This aligns with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') and is closely related to CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection'), where external input is treated as part of an executable command rather than data.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary system commands on the router with the privileges of the web/CGI process.
  • Complete compromise of router configuration, including DNS settings, routing rules, and firewall policies.
  • Installation of persistent malware or backdoors on the device firmware (where feasible).
  • Use of the router as a pivot point for attacks on devices behind it on the local network.
  • Participation of the compromised router in botnets, DDoS attacks, or traffic interception campaigns.
  • Exposure or manipulation of user traffic, including potential redirection to malicious destinations.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation centers on treating all web-facing configuration parameters as untrusted and confining how they are used in system-level operations.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Eliminate shell concatenation: Avoid passing raw strings to shell interpreters; instead, use APIs that accept argument arrays and do not invoke a shell.
  • Strict input validation: Enforce strict, type-aware validation on igmpVer and similar parameters (e.g., fixed enumerated values, numeric ranges) with clear rejection of unexpected characters.
  • Allow-listing over block-listing: Use explicit allow-lists of accepted values for configuration options like IGMP versions rather than trying to strip dangerous characters.
  • Least-privilege execution: Run web and CGI components with minimal system privileges and restricted capabilities, limiting the blast radius of a successful injection.
  • Configuration hardening: Disable remote administration over WAN by default and encourage deployment behind additional network protections, reducing exposure of the CGI interface.

How teams detect issues like this

High-level detection approaches include:

  • Static analysis: Scan CGI and router firmware code for patterns where HTTP parameters (like igmpVer) flow into functions such as system, popen, exec*, or shell commands with string concatenation.
  • Code review cues: During manual review, flag any path where configuration values are inserted into command strings without strict validation or structured argument handling.
  • Dynamic testing/fuzzing: Perform black-box testing of CGI endpoints with payloads containing shell metacharacters to detect anomalous behavior or command execution side effects.
  • Runtime monitoring: Where possible, monitor router logs or system processes for unusual command executions originating from the web server context.
  • Automated security tooling: Utilize firmware analysis platforms or SAST tools configured with rules for command injection, focusing on web handler code and configuration endpoints.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Litengzheng/vuldb_new/blob/main/A7100RU/vul_158/README.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/791272
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/356378
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/356378/cti
totolink.nettotolink.net/

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The flaw resides in the router's HTTP-based management interface and can be triggered remotely by sending crafted requests to the affected CGI endpoint, subject to network reachability and any access controls.

Requirements depend on how the router is configured. If the vulnerable endpoint is accessible without strong authentication or is exposed over the WAN, an attacker may exploit it without local network access. In more restricted setups, attackers would first need to obtain credentials or local-network access.

Replace any shell-based command construction with calls to safer process-execution APIs that separate arguments from executable paths, and ensure all parameters are strictly validated against allow-lists or constrained types before use.

Adopt secure coding standards for command execution, enforce rigorous input validation for all web management interfaces, minimize the need for shell invocation in configuration workflows, and integrate security review and automated analysis into the firmware development lifecycle.

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