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CVE-2026-58452

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

OS Command Injection (CWE-78) in JAIOTlink C492A-W6 Camera

CVE-2026-58452

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Authenticated Remote Code Execution on Device

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

JAIOTlink C492A-W6 Wi-Fi IP cameras contain an OS command injection flaw in the NetSDK/Factory SetMAC HTTP endpoint, where user-supplied Wireless parameters are concatenated into a shell command.

An authenticated attacker can craft MAC-like input with an appended shell payload, leading to remote code execution on the camera whenever the vulnerable handler processes the request.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in the embedded web management interface of JAIOTlink C492A-W6 Wi-Fi IP cameras running firmware 4.8.30.57701411.

Specifically, it affects the HTTP PUT NetSDK/Factory SetMAC endpoint, which parses Wireless configuration parameters and invokes an echo command through a system() wrapper.

The issue is exposed when MAC-like strings received over HTTP are only partially validated and then passed directly into a shell command without proper sanitization or argument separation.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP management interface of the camera, specifically the NetSDK/Factory SetMAC endpoint.
  • Required access: Valid authentication or equivalent access that allows invoking the SetMAC endpoint.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted Wireless parameter that begins with a syntactically valid MAC-like prefix followed by a semicolon and arbitrary shell commands.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The handler relies on sscanf() for minimal format checking, then interpolates the user-controlled string into an echo command that is executed via system() without escaping or safe argument handling, allowing the shell to interpret injected commands.

Why this happens

This issue stems from constructing shell commands by concatenating user-controlled data and executing them via a system() wrapper.

The parsing logic uses sscanf() to partially validate that input resembles a MAC address, but it does not enforce strict bounds or reject additional shell metacharacters such as semicolons.

As a result, the Wireless parameter is treated as trusted and passed to a shell command line, mapping to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), where untrusted input is incorporated into OS-level commands.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the camera's web service or underlying system user.
  • The device configuration and stored data could be modified, exfiltrated, or wiped.
  • The camera could be repurposed as a foothold for lateral movement within the local network.
  • The device could be enrolled into a botnet or used to conduct further attacks such as DDoS or reconnaissance.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on eliminating direct shell invocation with untrusted input and tightening input validation.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Avoiding system() and similar shell-based APIs for tasks like setting MAC addresses; instead, use direct system calls or dedicated libraries that accept structured parameters.
  • Performing strict, whitelist-based validation on MAC address inputs, enforcing exact length, allowed characters, and format without permitting additional trailing data.
  • Treating any configuration parameter received over HTTP as untrusted and separating data from commands, for example by using parameterized APIs instead of string concatenation.
  • Running web management components with the least privileges necessary and applying OS-level controls (such as restricted shells or confined execution environments) to limit the blast radius of any command execution.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can focus on both code-level analysis and runtime behavior:

  • Static analysis rules that flag uses of system(), popen(), or equivalent wrappers where arguments are built from HTTP parameters or other user-supplied data.
  • Manual code review looking for string concatenation patterns that form shell commands, especially in configuration endpoints that process network-facing input like MAC addresses or Wi-Fi settings.
  • Security testing and fuzzing of HTTP endpoints with MAC-like and shell-metacharacter-laden input to identify unexpected command execution behavior.
  • Policy-based checks in CI/CD to prevent introduction of new shell command constructions using unsanitized external input, enforced by automated code review tools.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/rwprimitives/jaiotlink-c492a-wifi-camera/blob/main/writeups/01-setmac-command-injection.md
amazon.comamazon.com/stores/JAIOTlink/page/3B00DC41-70C3-4BAA-925C-3D222C2633D5?lp_asin=B0GX1BNZ78&ref_=ast_bln&store_ref=bl_ast_dp_brandlogo_sto
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/jaiotlink-c492a-w6-os-command-injection-via-setmac-endpoint

Frequently asked

questions

It can be exploited remotely if the camera's management interface is exposed and reachable, but it still requires valid authentication or equivalent access to invoke the affected endpoint.

The attacker needs authenticated access to the HTTP interface that exposes the NetSDK/Factory SetMAC endpoint, such as valid user credentials or another means of invoking authenticated requests.

The most robust fix is to remove the reliance on system() or shell commands for applying MAC changes and instead use dedicated APIs or system calls that accept structured parameters, combined with strict whitelist validation of MAC address format.

Future implementations should adopt a defensive design that never builds shell commands from external input, enforce strong input validation schemas, integrate secure coding checks into development workflows, and include security testing focused on injection patterns for all network-exposed configuration endpoints.

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