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CVE-2026-58434

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Private Repository Metadata Leak (CWE-200) in ACLs

CVE-2026-58434

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Information Exposure

CWE:

CWE-200, CWE-862

Impact:

Unauthorized disclosure of private repository metadata

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A private repository may continue exposing metadata after a user's or system's access has been revoked. This can allow unauthorized parties to discover repository details, activity, or related information when access checks are incomplete or stale.

Affected context

The issue can occur in repository hosting or management systems that retain metadata access after revocation events. Risk is higher when authorization state is cached, access-control changes are processed asynchronously, or metadata endpoints apply weaker checks than repository content endpoints.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Repository metadata, API, search, or activity endpoints - Required access: Previously authorized access, a valid session, or another

path that can reach metadata services, depending on deployment controls

  • Trigger point: Requests made after repository access has been revoked - Why exploitation is possible: Revocation is not consistently enforced

across metadata resources, allowing stale authorization state or missing

permission checks to disclose information

Why this happens

The underlying issue is an authorization lifecycle failure combined with information exposure. The system does not reliably invalidate or re-evaluate permissions for metadata after access is revoked, which maps to CWE-200. Related missing or incomplete authorization checks map to CWE-862, where a resource is accessible without an effective authorization decision.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized parties may learn private repository names, identifiers, or settings
  • Repository activity, ownership, or contributor information could be disclosed
  • Exposed metadata may support targeted reconnaissance or social engineering
  • Sensitive project relationships or operational details could be inferred
  • Disclosure could increase the risk of follow-on attacks against repository content or integrations

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on making authorization decisions consistent, immediate, and server-side across all repository resources. Secure-by-default patterns include denying metadata access unless the current principal is authorized, rechecking permissions after revocation, invalidating related sessions and caches, and applying the same policy to search and auxiliary API endpoints. Access should be limited by least privilege, and metadata returned to unauthorized callers should be minimized. Revocation workflows should reduce reliance on stale client or service state.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches include static and dynamic review of metadata endpoints, authorization middleware, cache invalidation paths, and revocation workflows. Code review should look for permission checks that differ between content and metadata APIs, cached authorization decisions without bounded invalidation, and default-allow behavior. Policy enforcement can require centralized authorization checks, revocation test cases, and audit events for post-revocation access attempts. Automated security testing and code review tools may help identify inconsistent access-control patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
blog.gitea.comblog.gitea.com/gitea-1.27.0-is-released/
github.comgithub.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0
github.comgithub.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-j2w3-9c3r-g83q

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable when repository metadata is available through

network-accessible APIs and the requester can reach the affected endpoint.

Exploitability depends on whether a revoked identity, session, or cached

authorization state remains usable.

Often, yes. A previously authorized account or session may be sufficient, but

the exact requirement depends on how the repository service handles revoked

identities and anonymous metadata requests.

Enforce a fresh, server-side authorization decision for every metadata access

and ensure revocation invalidates relevant sessions, tokens, and cached policy

state.

Treat metadata as protected repository content, use centralized access-control

enforcement, test authorization immediately before and after revocation, and

monitor for successful requests from revoked principals.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.