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CVE-2026-58427

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Information Exposure (CWE-200) in Private /members API

CVE-2026-58427

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Information Exposure

CWE:

CWE-200, CWE-863

Impact:

Unauthorized Disclosure of Private Organization Membership

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An incomplete fix in the /members API can disclose the member list of private organizations to users who should not be able to view it. The issue becomes risky when authorization checks do not consistently enforce the organization's private visibility rules across this endpoint.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in applications exposing organization membership through a /members API endpoint. It is relevant when private organization data is returned without consistently verifying whether the requesting principal is authorized to view the member list, including after a prior partial remediation.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The /members API endpoint
  • Required access: An API caller or authenticated user able to reach the endpoint; the exact privilege level depends on deployment and routing controls
  • Trigger point: A request for membership data associated with a private organization
  • Why exploitation is possible: Authorization and privacy checks may be incomplete or inconsistently applied, allowing private member records to be returned to an unauthorized requester

Why this happens

The underlying issue is an information exposure caused by incomplete access-control enforcement. The endpoint can disclose data associated with a private organization when its authorization logic does not adequately verify the requester's relationship to the organization or apply private-visibility rules. This maps primarily to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, with CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization describing the missing or ineffective permission check.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized users may learn the identities or accounts of private organization members
  • Exposed membership data could support targeted phishing, harassment, or social engineering
  • Attackers could infer organizational relationships and account affiliations
  • The disclosure may increase the impact of other account or authorization attacks

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on making authorization checks complete, centralized, and consistent for every membership data path.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Enforcing server-side authorization before retrieving or serializing private membership data
  • Applying a deny-by-default policy for private organizations
  • Using a shared authorization decision for related list, detail, pagination, and alternate endpoint flows
  • Returning only the minimum membership attributes required by an authorized caller
  • Treating organization privacy settings as security-sensitive data rather than client-controlled presentation state
  • Testing authorization behavior across owners, members, non-members, anonymous callers, and revoked users
  • Limiting service and API privileges so a compromised caller cannot broadly enumerate organizations

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations commonly detect this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review for endpoint handlers that fetch or serialize membership data before authorization
  • Review signals such as client-supplied organization identifiers being trusted without an independent permission decision
  • Authorization matrix tests covering private and public organizations, role changes, pagination, and alternate request formats
  • API gateway or policy enforcement rules that require an explicit authorization decision for private organization resources
  • Monitoring for unusual enumeration of organization identifiers or repeated membership-list requests
  • Automated security tests that compare responses for authorized and unauthorized principals

Sources

SourceLink
blog.gitea.comblog.gitea.com/gitea-1.27.0-is-released/
github.comgithub.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0
github.comgithub.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-prr9-9mp4-5gp2

Frequently asked

questions

Potentially. Any caller who can reach the /members endpoint may be able to exploit the issue if the endpoint returns private membership data without a sufficient authorization check.

Not necessarily. The required access depends on the application's routing and authentication controls, but authenticated users with insufficient privileges may still be affected.

Enforce a server-side, deny-by-default authorization decision before retrieving or returning private organization membership data, and apply it consistently across all endpoint variants.

Maintain centralized authorization policies, minimize returned fields, test every privacy and role combination, and monitor for enumeration patterns against organization membership APIs.

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