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CVE-2026-58419

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Information Disclosure (CWE-200) in Issue Notification API

CVE-2026-58419

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Information Disclosure

CWE:

CWE-200

Impact:

Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Information

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An information disclosure flaw in an issue tracking notification API allows private issue metadata to remain accessible even after a user's access has been revoked.

When notification mechanisms do not re-check authorization on delivery, an attacker who previously had access can continue to receive sensitive issue details, exposing confidential project or security information.

Affected context

This vulnerability typically appears in systems that provide notification or subscription APIs for issue tracking or ticketing workflows.

It is most relevant where:

  • Users can follow or subscribe to issues, tickets, or discussions
  • Access to issues is governed by roles, groups, or project permissions
  • Notification endpoints or background jobs rely on cached or historical authorization state

Under these conditions, revoking a user's access to a project or issue may not immediately propagate to all notification channels, leaving a window where private metadata continues to leak.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Issue notification API, webhooks, push notifications, or email generation endpoints
  • Required access: Prior legitimate access to the issue or project, plus an active notification subscription or delivery channel
  • Trigger point: Delivery of notifications after access revocation (e.g., status changes, comments, or field updates)
  • Why exploitation is possible: The notification subsystem does not consistently revalidate permissions at send time, relying instead on outdated authorization data or subscription state that was established before revocation

Why this happens

The underlying bug is a classic authorization mismatch between core data access and secondary delivery mechanisms.

While direct reads of issue metadata may correctly enforce permissions, the notification API or background jobs can bypass or reuse stale authorization decisions.

This maps to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, because sensitive issue details (such as titles, descriptions, tags, or internal comments) are exposed through a side channel that fails to respect updated access controls.

Abstractly, the insecure pattern is relying on one-time permission checks (at subscription time) instead of continuous enforcement at every path where sensitive data is transmitted.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized parties may receive ongoing updates about private issues
  • Sensitive project or security incident metadata could be disclosed
  • Internal comments and workflow states can be exposed outside intended teams
  • Regulatory or contractual confidentiality requirements may be violated
  • Attackers could infer system architecture, incident handling processes, or security weaknesses from leaked issue details

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on aligning notification delivery paths with core authorization logic and treating notifications as high-risk data flows.

Common secure patterns include:

  • Performing fresh authorization checks at notification generation time, using the same access control logic as primary read endpoints
  • Designing subscriptions as references that always respect current permissions, rather than immutable grants
  • Minimizing sensitive metadata in notifications, using redaction or summarization where possible
  • Applying least-privilege principles to roles and groups so that issue access is tightly scoped
  • Centralizing authorization decisions so that all APIs and background workers consume a single, consistent policy engine

These patterns help ensure that revocation is honored across all delivery mechanisms, not just direct UI or API reads.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection often involves both technical and process-oriented approaches:

  • Reviewing notification and webhook code for any paths that construct issue payloads without explicit, up-to-date permission checks
  • Using static analysis or policy-as-code tools to flag data flows that bypass central authorization utilities
  • Implementing logging that correlates notification delivery with current permission state, then monitoring for mismatches
  • Conducting targeted access review tests: revoke access for test accounts and verify that no further notifications containing sensitive details are delivered
  • Enforcing architectural guidelines that require all secondary data channels (emails, webhooks, push notifications) to call shared authorization services

Sources

SourceLink
blog.gitea.comblog.gitea.com/release-of-1.26.3-and-1.26.4/
github.comgithub.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38108
github.comgithub.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.26.4
github.comgithub.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-44qc-pgvp-wx7v

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability is typically limited to users or integrations that previously had legitimate access to issues and still receive notifications.

However, the impact can be significant if those recipients retain channels like email, webhooks, or push subscriptions after revocation.

An attacker usually needs prior access to the relevant project or issue, plus an established notification channel (such as a webhook URL or subscribed email address).

Once access is revoked, they can continue to benefit from the misconfigured notification pipeline if authorization is not revalidated.

The most robust fix is to centralize permission checks and ensure that every notification or webhook generation path performs a fresh authorization check for each recipient.

Additionally, restructuring subscription models so they dynamically reflect current permissions rather than preserving historical grants reduces leakage risk.

Prevention strategies include designing notifications as secondary views guarded by the same access controls as primary APIs, enforcing policy-as-code for authorization, and mandating security reviews for any new data delivery channels.

Regular testing of revocation flows, combined with redaction of sensitive details in notifications, helps catch and avoid future information disclosure bugs.

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