Summary
Tenda i3 firmware 1.0.0.6(2204) contains a path traversal vulnerability in the R7WebsSecurityHandler function of its HTTP handler component.
A remote attacker can manipulate HTTP requests to traverse directories on the device's filesystem, potentially accessing files outside the intended web root and exposing sensitive configuration or system data.
Affected context
This vulnerability affects Tenda i3 routers running firmware version 1.0.0.6(2204) where the embedded HTTP server exposes endpoints processed by the R7WebsSecurityHandler.
The issue manifests when user-controlled path parameters in HTTP requests are insufficiently validated or normalized before being used to resolve filesystem paths on the device.
In typical deployments, the router's web management interface is reachable from the local network and, in some misconfigurations, from the internet, broadening the exposure.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP management interface on the Tenda i3 device
- Required access: Network-level access to the router's web interface (local network or remotely if exposed via port forwarding/DMZ)
- Trigger point: Crafted HTTP requests handled by
R7WebsSecurityHandlerthat include path elements under attacker control - Why exploitation is possible: The handler constructs filesystem paths using user-supplied input without robust canonicalization or restriction to a fixed directory, enabling traversal using sequences such as parent-directory references
Why this happens
The root cause aligns with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').
The R7WebsSecurityHandler appears to accept user-supplied path components from HTTP requests and uses them directly, or with incomplete checks, to build filesystem paths for resource access.
Without strict normalization, canonicalization, and enforcement of a confined base directory, an attacker can introduce traversal patterns that cause the application to read files outside the intended document root, violating the expected access boundaries of the web interface.
Potential impact
- Reading configuration files that may contain administrative credentials or network settings
- Exposing system files that reveal device internals useful for further exploitation
- Disclosure of logs or backup files that could contain sensitive user or network information
- Assisting in chaining with other vulnerabilities to gain higher-privilege access or arbitrary code execution
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on confining file access to a strict, well-defined directory and distrust of all path input from clients.
General defensive patterns include:
- Normalizing and canonicalizing requested paths before use, then verifying they remain within an allowed base directory
- Rejecting or sanitizing traversal sequences and disallowed characters (such as
../patterns) rather than attempting ad hoc filtering - Using high-level APIs that map logical resource identifiers to files without exposing raw filesystem layout
- Enforcing least-privilege on the HTTP process so that, even if traversal occurs, accessible files are minimally sensitive
- Segmenting management interfaces from untrusted networks, limiting which clients can reach the vulnerable HTTP handler
How teams detect issues like this
Detection efforts can combine code-centric and operational perspectives:
- Static analysis rules that flag direct concatenation of user-controlled input into filesystem paths in HTTP handlers
- Code review checklists that highlight any use of request parameters to access files without explicit base-path enforcement and canonicalization
- Runtime monitoring and logging for suspicious patterns in requested paths (e.g., repeated
../or encoded traversal sequences) - Web application firewall or reverse proxy rules to detect and optionally block path traversal signatures before they reach the device
Organizations may also use automated firmware analysis tools to scan embedded web applications for directory traversal patterns as part of product security reviews.

