Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Path Traversal in Tenda i3 HTTP R7WebsSecurityHandler

CVE-2026-5841

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Unauthorized File System Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

Tenda i3 firmware 1.0.0.6(2204) contains a path traversal vulnerability in the R7WebsSecurityHandler function of its HTTP handler component.

A remote attacker can manipulate HTTP requests to traverse directories on the device's filesystem, potentially accessing files outside the intended web root and exposing sensitive configuration or system data.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects Tenda i3 routers running firmware version 1.0.0.6(2204) where the embedded HTTP server exposes endpoints processed by the R7WebsSecurityHandler.

The issue manifests when user-controlled path parameters in HTTP requests are insufficiently validated or normalized before being used to resolve filesystem paths on the device.

In typical deployments, the router's web management interface is reachable from the local network and, in some misconfigurations, from the internet, broadening the exposure.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP management interface on the Tenda i3 device
  • Required access: Network-level access to the router's web interface (local network or remotely if exposed via port forwarding/DMZ)
  • Trigger point: Crafted HTTP requests handled by R7WebsSecurityHandler that include path elements under attacker control
  • Why exploitation is possible: The handler constructs filesystem paths using user-supplied input without robust canonicalization or restriction to a fixed directory, enabling traversal using sequences such as parent-directory references

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').

The R7WebsSecurityHandler appears to accept user-supplied path components from HTTP requests and uses them directly, or with incomplete checks, to build filesystem paths for resource access.

Without strict normalization, canonicalization, and enforcement of a confined base directory, an attacker can introduce traversal patterns that cause the application to read files outside the intended document root, violating the expected access boundaries of the web interface.

Potential impact

  • Reading configuration files that may contain administrative credentials or network settings
  • Exposing system files that reveal device internals useful for further exploitation
  • Disclosure of logs or backup files that could contain sensitive user or network information
  • Assisting in chaining with other vulnerabilities to gain higher-privilege access or arbitrary code execution

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on confining file access to a strict, well-defined directory and distrust of all path input from clients.

General defensive patterns include:

  • Normalizing and canonicalizing requested paths before use, then verifying they remain within an allowed base directory
  • Rejecting or sanitizing traversal sequences and disallowed characters (such as ../ patterns) rather than attempting ad hoc filtering
  • Using high-level APIs that map logical resource identifiers to files without exposing raw filesystem layout
  • Enforcing least-privilege on the HTTP process so that, even if traversal occurs, accessible files are minimally sensitive
  • Segmenting management interfaces from untrusted networks, limiting which clients can reach the vulnerable HTTP handler

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can combine code-centric and operational perspectives:

  • Static analysis rules that flag direct concatenation of user-controlled input into filesystem paths in HTTP handlers
  • Code review checklists that highlight any use of request parameters to access files without explicit base-path enforcement and canonicalization
  • Runtime monitoring and logging for suspicious patterns in requested paths (e.g., repeated ../ or encoded traversal sequences)
  • Web application firewall or reverse proxy rules to detect and optionally block path traversal signatures before they reach the device

Organizations may also use automated firmware analysis tools to scan embedded web applications for directory traversal patterns as part of product security reviews.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/MrXiaoFan/TendaVul/tree/main/tenda-i3-V1.0.0.6(2204)-R7WebsSecurityHandler-Authentication%20Bypass%20Issues
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/789935
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/356297
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/356297/cti
tenda.com.cntenda.com.cn/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how the router is deployed. If the web management interface is accessible from the internet through port forwarding, remote administration, or misconfiguration, attackers on the internet could reach the vulnerable handler. If it is restricted to the LAN, attackers would generally need local network access.

Public reports indicate that exploitation primarily relies on sending crafted HTTP requests to the handler, but whether authentication is required depends on how the vulnerable endpoint is wired into the HTTP routing and access control logic. Security assumptions should treat any user-controlled path parameter as untrusted, regardless of authentication.

The most robust fix is to ensure that all filesystem access performed by the HTTP handler is confined to a predefined base directory. This includes canonicalizing paths, rejecting any request that would resolve outside the allowed directory, and avoiding direct use of raw request paths when opening files.

Prevention relies on adopting secure design patterns: treat all path inputs as untrusted, enforce strict base-directory checks, use vetted path resolution utilities, and include path traversal checks in code review and automated testing. Additionally, embedding security-focused linting and static analysis into the development pipeline helps catch new instances before release.

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