Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SSRF in api-lab-mcp HTTP Interface

CVE-2026-5832

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Internal Network Access / SSRF

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the api-lab-mcp HTTP Interface allows attackers to manipulate the source/url argument so the server makes arbitrary outbound HTTP requests.

When exploited remotely, this can turn the application into a network pivot to reach internal or protected services that are not directly accessible from the internet.

Affected context

The weakness exists in the HTTP Interface of api-lab-mcp (up to version 0.2.1), specifically in the analyze_api_spec/generate_test_scenarios/test_http_endpoint functionality in src/mcp/http-server.ts.

It manifests when user-controlled input in the source/url parameter is used to initiate HTTP requests from the server without sufficient validation or restriction of target hosts, schemes, or IP ranges.

Deployments where the HTTP server has access to internal networks, metadata services, or other sensitive endpoints are most at risk, though any environment that allows outbound connections can be affected.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Publicly exposed HTTP Interface endpoints that accept source/url or similar parameters.
  • Required access: Remote network access to the API endpoint; no special privileges are necessarily required beyond the ability to send crafted HTTP requests.
  • Trigger point: Invocation of the analyze_api_spec, generate_test_scenarios, or test_http_endpoint flows where the server uses the supplied URL to perform HTTP requests.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server trusts the source/url parameter and forwards requests to arbitrary destinations without enforcing allowlists, blocking internal address ranges, or validating schemes, enabling classic SSRF behavior.

Why this happens

The core issue aligns with CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).

The HTTP server uses user-supplied URLs to initiate outbound HTTP requests as part of analyzing API specs and testing endpoints.

Because these URLs are not constrained to safe destinations, an attacker can coerce the server into connecting to arbitrary hosts, including internal IPs, cloud metadata endpoints, or other restricted services.

This pattern stems from conflating "where the server is allowed to connect" with "where users want to test," and failing to enforce network-layer and application-layer restrictions on request targets.

Potential impact

  • Access to internal HTTP services that are not directly exposed to the internet
  • Interaction with cloud provider metadata services, which may lead to credential or token disclosure
  • Port scanning or service enumeration of internal networks via HTTP-based probes
  • Use of the application as a proxy to bypass network-based access controls or firewalls
  • Potential data exfiltration from internal APIs reachable by the vulnerable server

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on strictly controlling where the server is allowed to send outbound requests and how URLs are interpreted:

  • Enforce explicit allowlists of domains or service endpoints that the HTTP Interface may contact; reject all other targets by default.
  • Block connections to private, link-local, and loopback address ranges (e.g., RFC1918, 127.0.0.0/8, ::1, link-local/metadata IPs) at both application and network layers where feasible.
  • Normalize and validate URL schemes (e.g., allowing only https and http) and reject unusual or unsafe schemes.
  • Introduce a dedicated outbound proxy for all HTTP requests and enforce policy at the proxy level to constrain reachable destinations.
  • Minimize privileges and network reach of the service by placing it in segmented network zones with only the necessary outbound routes.
  • Treat user-specified URLs as untrusted inputs and avoid mixing them with sensitive authentication material unless absolutely required and highly constrained.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves a combination of code analysis, testing, and runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis / code review:
  • Look for code paths where user-controlled parameters (e.g., source/url) are directly passed into HTTP client functions without validation.
  • Flag patterns like fetch(userUrl), axios(userUrl), or similar in http-server.ts and related modules, particularly in testing or introspection utilities.
  • Verify that any URL validation logic includes host/IP checks and not just syntax checks.
  • Dynamic testing:
  • Use security scanners or integration tests to supply URLs targeting internal IP ranges, loopback, or metadata endpoints and observe whether requests are forwarded.
  • Incorporate SSRF tests into API-level automated test suites for endpoints that make outbound calls.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Monitor outbound traffic from the service for unusual destinations such as internal IPs, metadata services, or unexpected ports.
  • Configure logging of outbound request targets from the HTTP Interface and alert on deviations from expected domain patterns.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/BruceJqs/public_exp/issues/6
github.comgithub.com/atototo/api-lab-mcp/
github.comgithub.com/atototo/api-lab-mcp/issues/4
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/789765
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/356288
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/356288/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker who can reach the exposed HTTP Interface and control the source/url parameter can trigger SSRF remotely without needing local access to the server.

Typically, only network-level access to the vulnerable endpoint is required. Authentication requirements, if any, depend on how the api-lab-mcp instance is deployed, but the underlying flaw does not inherently require elevated privileges.

Constrain all server-initiated HTTP requests to a small, explicit allowlist of permitted domains or services, block internal/loopback/metadata addresses, and centralize outbound requests through a controlled proxy layer where policy can be enforced.

Design APIs so that user input is not used directly as a network target; instead, map user choices to pre-approved destinations. Apply strict URL validation, network segmentation, and proxy-based egress controls, and include SSRF-specific checks in code review and security testing processes.

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