Summary
A server-side request forgery vulnerability in a repository migration workflow allows a validated Git URL to redirect to a different destination after the initial allow/block check.
If the migration service can reach internal or otherwise restricted Git endpoints, an attacker may abuse this behavior to retrieve repository data or probe protected network services.
Affected context
This issue occurs in repository migration components that:
- Accept user-controlled or externally supplied Git repository URLs
- Validate the initial URL against allowlists or blocklists
- Follow HTTP redirects during repository retrieval
- Permit the redirected destination to differ from the validated destination
Risk depends on the migration service's network reachability, credentials, and access to internal Git infrastructure.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Repository import or migration URL handling
- Required access: Ability to submit or influence a repository URL processed by the migration service
- Trigger point: Network retrieval after the initial URL validation
- Why exploitation is possible: Redirect handling may cause the server to connect to a destination that was not covered by the original allow/block decision
- Additional conditions: The service must be able to reach the redirected internal or restricted resource, and useful data must be returned through the migration workflow
Why this happens
The underlying bug is a mismatch between URL validation and subsequent request behavior. The migration service evaluates the initial Git URL but then follows a server-side HTTP redirect without applying equivalent destination validation to each request.
This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, because attacker-influenced network requests can be induced from a trusted server to destinations that the attacker may not reach directly. The insecure pattern is treating the first validated URL as authoritative while allowing request redirects to change the effective destination.
Potential impact
- Sensitive internal Git repositories may be read or exfiltrated
- Private source code, configuration, or repository metadata could be exposed
- Internal services may be probed through the migration service
- Requests may reach cloud or platform metadata endpoints where network access permits
- Repository migration credentials or service identity permissions could amplify the impact
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on validating the effective destination throughout the complete request lifecycle rather than trusting only the initial URL.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Disabling redirects when they are not required for repository migration
- Revalidating every redirect destination against strict host, scheme, port, and address policies
- Resolving hostnames and rejecting private, loopback, link-local, and other restricted address ranges where appropriate
- Restricting outbound network access from migration workers through egress policies
- Using narrowly scoped credentials that cannot access unrelated repositories or internal services
- Avoiding exposure of raw response contents when a migration operation fails
- Applying secure-by-default URL parsing and transport policies consistently across all migration paths
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches can include:
- Static analysis for HTTP clients that enable redirects without destination revalidation
- Code review checks comparing URL validation logic with redirect and DNS-resolution behavior
- Tests covering redirects to private addresses, alternate ports, local hostnames, and cloud metadata ranges
- Network monitoring for migration workers making unexpected requests to internal address space
- Egress policy alerts for connections outside approved Git hosting domains
- Automated security review tools that identify server-side request forgery patterns and unsafe redirect handling

