Summary
PraisonAI versions 4.6.10 through 4.6.58 contain a command-injection flaw in file-operation bridging for managed and sandboxed agents. An attacker who can influence a file-tool path argument may execute arbitrary shell commands in the configured compute environment, either on the host through local execution or inside a Docker container.
PraisonAI versions 4.6.10 through 4.6.58 contain a command-injection flaw in file-operation bridging for managed and sandboxed agents. An attacker who can influence a file-tool path argument may execute arbitrary shell commands in the configured compute environment, either on the host through local execution or inside a Docker container.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs when LocalManagedAgent or SandboxedAgent uses a compute provider to process file operations such as read_file, list_files, or write_file. Risk exists when an attacker can influence a path argument that is converted into a shell command without sufficient argument isolation, escaping, or validation. The resulting command executes with the permissions of the local subprocess or containerized compute provider.
The vulnerability occurs when LocalManagedAgent or SandboxedAgent uses a compute provider to process file operations such as read_file, list_files, or write_file. Risk exists when an attacker can influence a path argument that is converted into a shell command without sufficient argument isolation, escaping, or validation. The resulting command executes with the permissions of the local subprocess or containerized compute provider.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Agent file-tool operations connected to a shell-backed compute provider
- Required access: Ability to influence a file-tool path argument, directly or through agent-controlled input
- Trigger point: Bridging of file operations into shell command strings
- Execution context: The local host when using local compute, or the associated Docker container when using Docker
- Why exploitation is possible: Raw path values are incorporated into shell commands without reliably preventing shell metacharacter interpretation or argument-boundary manipulation
- Attack surface: Agent file-tool operations connected to a shell-backed compute provider
- Required access: Ability to influence a file-tool path argument, directly or through agent-controlled input
- Trigger point: Bridging of file operations into shell command strings
- Execution context: The local host when using local compute, or the associated Docker container when using Docker
- Why exploitation is possible: Raw path values are incorporated into shell commands without reliably preventing shell metacharacter interpretation or argument-boundary manipulation
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an unsafe conversion of user-influenced file paths into shell command strings. Rather than passing paths as separate, safely encoded process arguments or using direct file APIs, the bridge constructs commands that are interpreted by a shell. This permits shell syntax embedded in a path value to alter command meaning, mapping to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command. The associated CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization may also apply where untrusted users or agents are allowed to invoke file operations beyond their intended authority.
The underlying bug is an unsafe conversion of user-influenced file paths into shell command strings. Rather than passing paths as separate, safely encoded process arguments or using direct file APIs, the bridge constructs commands that are interpreted by a shell. This permits shell syntax embedded in a path value to alter command meaning, mapping to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command. The associated CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization may also apply where untrusted users or agents are allowed to invoke file operations beyond their intended authority.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary commands in the compute environment
- The local host could be affected when local subprocess execution is enabled
- A containerized workload could be compromised when Docker compute is used
- Sensitive files, environment variables, or credentials may be accessed
- Data could be modified, deleted, or exfiltrated
- The compromised compute context could be used for lateral movement or further application abuse
- An attacker may execute arbitrary commands in the compute environment
- The local host could be affected when local subprocess execution is enabled
- A containerized workload could be compromised when Docker compute is used
- Sensitive files, environment variables, or credentials may be accessed
- Data could be modified, deleted, or exfiltrated
- The compromised compute context could be used for lateral movement or further application abuse
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from file-operation bridging and reducing the authority of agent-controlled actions.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use direct filesystem APIs or process execution interfaces that pass arguments separately rather than constructing shell command strings
- Apply strict path validation, canonicalization, and confinement to approved directories
- Treat all agent- and user-influenced paths as untrusted, even when they originate from internal tools
- Use secure quoting only as a defense-in-depth measure, not as a replacement for avoiding shell execution
- Run compute providers with least privilege and isolate them from sensitive host resources
- Restrict container capabilities, mounts, network access, and credential exposure
- Enforce authorization checks for file operations and limit tools to the minimum required scope
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from file-operation bridging and reducing the authority of agent-controlled actions.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use direct filesystem APIs or process execution interfaces that pass arguments separately rather than constructing shell command strings
- Apply strict path validation, canonicalization, and confinement to approved directories
- Treat all agent- and user-influenced paths as untrusted, even when they originate from internal tools
- Use secure quoting only as a defense-in-depth measure, not as a replacement for avoiding shell execution
- Run compute providers with least privilege and isolate them from sensitive host resources
- Restrict container capabilities, mounts, network access, and credential exposure
- Enforce authorization checks for file operations and limit tools to the minimum required scope
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static analysis rules that flag string concatenation, interpolation, or formatting of file paths into shell commands
- Code review checks for subprocess or shell APIs receiving composite command strings
- Tests using metacharacters, quoting boundaries, separators, and traversal patterns as file-tool inputs
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes or shell invocation from agent workers
- Policy enforcement that prohibits shell-backed execution for operations that can use direct filesystem APIs
- Automated security review tools configured to identify command-injection and authorization-boundary patterns
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static analysis rules that flag string concatenation, interpolation, or formatting of file paths into shell commands
- Code review checks for subprocess or shell APIs receiving composite command strings
- Tests using metacharacters, quoting boundaries, separators, and traversal patterns as file-tool inputs
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes or shell invocation from agent workers
- Policy enforcement that prohibits shell-backed execution for operations that can use direct filesystem APIs
- Automated security review tools configured to identify command-injection and authorization-boundary patterns
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
