Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

OS Command Injection in AWS Research and Engineering Studio

CVE-2026-5709

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on cluster-manager EC2 instance

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An OS command injection flaw in the FileBrowser API of AWS Research and Engineering Studio (RES) allows crafted input from authenticated users to be incorporated into shell commands on the cluster-manager EC2 instance.

When an attacker can reach the vulnerable FileBrowser functionality, they may execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the RES cluster-manager service, potentially compromising the underlying host and associated workloads.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises within the FileBrowser API of AWS Research and Engineering Studio when user-supplied parameters are passed into underlying operating system commands.

It primarily affects deployments where:

  • The RES FileBrowser feature is enabled and exposed to authenticated users
  • The cluster-manager EC2 instance processes FileBrowser requests
  • Input from the client is trusted without sufficient normalization, validation, or escaping

The risk increases in environments where the cluster-manager instance has broad access to other infrastructure components or sensitive data.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: RES FileBrowser API endpoint accessible over the management interface or web UI.
  • Required access: Remote authenticated access to RES with permissions to use the FileBrowser functionality.
  • Trigger point: Submission of specially crafted input fields (e.g., file paths or operation parameters) that are concatenated or interpolated into shell commands on the cluster-manager instance.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server-side logic executes OS commands that include user-controllable data without robust sanitization, parameterization, or safe command construction, enabling injection of additional shell metacharacters or arguments.

Why this happens

The underlying bug stems from constructing and executing operating system commands using untrusted input from the FileBrowser API without enforcing strict validation or secure command-building patterns.

Instead of treating user data as opaque values, the application allows portions of user-controlled strings to influence the structure of a shell command, matching CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection').

This pattern typically occurs when APIs like exec, system, or shell wrappers are used with string concatenation or interpolation, rather than with strict argument lists or dedicated filesystem APIs.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary commands on the cluster-manager EC2 instance
  • Reading, modifying, or deleting files accessible to the cluster-manager service
  • Lateral movement to other instances or services reachable from the cluster-manager
  • Exfiltration of credentials, configuration secrets, or research data
  • Interruption or tampering with research workloads and pipelines

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation relies on reducing trust in user input and avoiding shell-based command construction for FileBrowser actions.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Replacing shell invocations with language-native filesystem and process APIs that do not interpret shell metacharacters.
  • Using strict allowlists for operations, paths, and arguments, rejecting any input that does not conform to expected formats.
  • Avoiding string concatenation or interpolation when building commands; if command execution is unavoidable, use APIs that accept argument arrays and bypass the shell.
  • Applying robust input validation and canonicalization for file paths, ensuring they stay within permitted directories and do not contain control characters or meta-syntax.
  • Running the cluster-manager service and associated components with least privilege, limiting system and network access available to an attacker who gains command execution.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue and signs of exploitation through:

  • Static analysis: Rules that flag use of command-execution APIs (system, exec, OS subprocess calls) where arguments are directly influenced by HTTP parameters or request bodies.
  • Code review: Manual inspection of FileBrowser and file-management code paths for string-based shell commands, path handling, and weak validation logic.
  • Runtime monitoring: Collection and inspection of process execution logs on the cluster-manager instance for unexpected command patterns, anomalous arguments, or unusual parent-child process relationships.
  • Policy enforcement: CI/CD checks that block deployments when high-risk APIs are used without documented validation, or when filesystem operations are implemented via shell wrappers rather than safe APIs.

Sources

SourceLink
aws.amazon.comaws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/2026-014-aws/
github.comgithub.com/aws/res/issues/150
github.comgithub.com/aws/res/releases/tag/2026.03

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, it can be exploited remotely, but only by actors who can authenticate to AWS Research and Engineering Studio and access the FileBrowser functionality.

The attacker needs valid credentials or a session that allows interaction with the FileBrowser API or UI. Anonymous, unauthenticated access is not sufficient under normal configurations.

The safest approach is to eliminate shell-based command execution in FileBrowser logic, using language-native filesystem operations instead, and strictly validating all user-supplied input against well-defined, allowlisted expectations.

Adopt a secure coding standard that forbids building shell commands from user input, enforce input validation and output encoding guidelines, and integrate static analysis plus security-focused code reviews into the development lifecycle, especially around file and process management components.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.