Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

OS Command Injection in Totolink A7100RU setGameSpeedCfg

CVE-2026-5692

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on the Router

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Totolink A7100RU routers contain an OS command injection vulnerability in the setGameSpeedCfg function within /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi, where the enable parameter is not safely handled.

A remote attacker can craft HTTP requests that inject arbitrary shell commands via this parameter, potentially gaining full control over the device's operating system.

Affected context

The issue occurs in the web management interface of Totolink A7100RU firmware version 7.4cu.2313_b20191024, specifically in the setGameSpeedCfg handler exposed via /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi.

The vulnerability is reachable when the router's HTTP/HTTPS management interface is accessible (for example from the LAN, guest network, or if remote management is exposed to the internet).

It assumes that the enable argument from an HTTP request is passed into OS-level commands without robust validation, encoding, or proper separation from command interpreters.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface of the router, targeting /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi and the setGameSpeedCfg action.
  • Required access: Network-level access to the router's web management port (often LAN access; potentially WAN if remote administration is enabled or exposed).
  • Authentication requirements: Depends on deployment; in many embedded CGI cases, weak or missing authorization checks may make the endpoint reachable after minimal or default authentication, but actual requirements must be verified per configuration.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted HTTP request (e.g., GET/POST) that sets the enable argument to a value containing command separator characters and injected shell syntax.
  • Why exploitation is possible: User-supplied input from enable appears to be concatenated or interpolated into a shell command or passed to a command execution API without proper sanitization, quoting, or use of safe execution primitives, enabling arbitrary command execution under the router's runtime privileges.

Why this happens

This vulnerability stems from unsafe construction or execution of system-level commands using untrusted input in the setGameSpeedCfg code path.

Rather than treating request parameters as data, the implementation likely embeds the enable argument directly into a shell command string or passes it to a command interpreter without strict validation or escaping.

This pattern maps to:

  • CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'), where meta-characters (such as ;, &&, |) are not neutralized and thus alter command structure.
  • CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command, capturing the broader failure to sanitize command inputs.

Conceptually, the bug class is "data-as-code": an input field meant to represent a simple configuration flag (enable) is allowed to influence how and what commands are executed by the underlying operating system.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary OS commands on the router with the privileges of the web/CGI process (often root on embedded devices).
  • Full compromise of the router, including persistent malware installation or configuration backdoors.
  • Interception or manipulation of network traffic routed through the device (e.g., DNS hijacking, traffic redirection).
  • Use of the compromised router as a foothold for further attacks within the local network.
  • Enrollment of the device into botnets to perform DDoS or other coordinated attacks.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct command construction from request parameters and reducing the trust level of router management inputs:

  • Use parameterized and high-level APIs: Replace shell invocation with dedicated system or library calls that treat user values as data only (e.g., direct configuration APIs instead of shell wrappers).
  • Apply strict whitelisting: Constrain the enable parameter to a small, strongly-typed set of allowed values (e.g., boolean or enum) and reject any unexpected input before it reaches any OS interfaces.
  • Avoid shell interpretation where possible: Prefer non-shell system calls or internal logic over system(), popen(), or similar APIs that interpret special characters.
  • Enforce least privilege: Run the web/CGI service under a dedicated low-privilege account, with minimal OS capabilities and no unnecessary access to sensitive files or subsystems.
  • Harden management exposure: Restrict management access to trusted networks, disable unnecessary remote administration, and require strong authentication and session handling to reduce who can reach the vulnerable code path.
  • Defense in depth: Layer additional checks (input length limits, character allow-lists, config schema validation) so that even if one control is bypassed, dangerous input is less likely to reach command execution.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection commonly combines code-level inspection with behavioral monitoring:

  • Static analysis: Configure SAST tools or linters to flag uses of OS command execution APIs (system, popen, backtick operators, etc.) where any portion of the command string originates from HTTP request parameters, especially without strict validation or whitelisting.
  • Code review signals: During manual reviews of embedded web handlers, pay attention to:
  • CGI endpoints that build shell commands from query or form parameters.
  • String concatenation or formatting that mixes configuration fields (like enable) with command strings.
  • Lack of clear input validation routines before command execution.
  • Policy enforcement: Introduce secure coding guidelines that prohibit direct shell invocation from web-facing code unless strongly justified and reviewed, and enforce them through pre-commit checks and CI rules.
  • Runtime monitoring: On deployed devices where feasible, monitor for unusual child processes spawned by the web server/CGI binary or anomalous outbound traffic patterns that may indicate compromise.
  • Fuzzing and dynamic testing: Use HTTP fuzzers targeting CGI endpoints to identify unexpected shell behavior when special characters or command separators are supplied in parameters.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Litengzheng/vuldb_new/blob/main/A7100RU/vul_190/README.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/792963
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/355519
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/355519/cti
totolink.nettotolink.net/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, depending on how the router is deployed. If the management interface or specific CGI endpoint is exposed to the WAN (for example, via remote administration or port forwarding), an attacker on the internet could potentially exploit the command injection. If management is restricted to the LAN, exploitation generally requires local network access or prior compromise of an internal host.

The attacker must be able to send HTTP requests to the router's web interface that reach the setGameSpeedCfg handler. Authentication requirements depend on the router's configuration and any access control built into the endpoint; in some embedded products, such handlers are weakly protected or reachable after default-credential login.

The most robust fix is to remove shell-based command construction altogether: use dedicated APIs or internal logic that configure the device without invoking a command shell, and strictly validate that enable and similar parameters are limited to well-defined, strongly-typed values. Where command execution is unavoidable, compose commands using safe, argument-based APIs, and never concatenate raw user input into command strings.

Adopting secure coding patterns and enforcing them across the codebase is key: avoid passing user input to shells, apply input whitelisting and schema validation at all trust boundaries, design management endpoints around typed configuration objects rather than free-form strings, and institutionalize code review and automated scanning focused on command execution hotspots in embedded web components.

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