Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

OS Command Injection in Totolink A7100RU setNtpCfg CGI

CVE-2026-5689

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77, CWE-78

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on the Router

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Totolink A7100RU firmware 7.4cu.2313_b20191024 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the setNtpCfg handler of /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi, where the tz parameter is unsafely passed to the system shell.

A remote attacker who can send crafted HTTP requests to the router's web interface may inject arbitrary commands, potentially gaining full control over the device.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in the router's web management interface, specifically within the CGI endpoint /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi when handling NTP configuration through setNtpCfg.

It is exposed in environments where:

  • The web administration interface is reachable over the network (LAN and/or WAN), and
  • The firmware version is 7.4cu.2313_b20191024, and
  • Input provided in the tz (time zone) parameter is not robustly validated or sanitized before being passed to OS-level commands.

Depending on configuration, the interface may or may not require authentication, which strongly affects practical risk.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) requests to the router's /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi endpoint, using the setNtpCfg action.
  • Required access: Network reachability to the management interface; authentication requirements depend on deployment and router configuration.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted tz parameter value that breaks out of expected input and appends additional shell syntax.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application passes the tz argument directly—or via simple string concatenation—to an underlying shell command without proper escaping, parameterization, or input validation, enabling arbitrary command execution under the router's system account.

Why this happens

The root cause is an OS command injection flaw in the CGI handler that processes NTP configuration.

Instead of treating the tz parameter as opaque data and passing it as a safe argument to an OS API, the implementation appears to build shell commands dynamically using string concatenation or similar patterns.

This maps to:

  • CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, where untrusted data is incorporated into shell commands without adequate neutralization.
  • CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection'), representing the broader class of injection into command interpreters.

The insecure pattern is trusting user-controllable input when constructing shell commands, allowing meta-characters and control operators to alter command structure.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary system commands on the router.
  • Complete compromise of the device's configuration and management plane.
  • Installation of persistent malware or backdoors on the router.
  • Interception, redirection, or manipulation of network traffic passing through the device.
  • Use of the router as a pivot point for attacks against internal LAN hosts.
  • Enrollment of the device into botnets or distributed attack infrastructure.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct shell command construction and reducing trust in externally supplied configuration values:

  • Replace shell-based invocation with safer system APIs or dedicated libraries that accept arguments as structured parameters, not as concatenated command strings.
  • Apply strict server-side validation and canonicalization of configuration fields like tz, limiting values to a whitelist of known-good time zone identifiers.
  • Neutralize or reject shell metacharacters and control operators if any user input must pass near command execution paths.
  • Run router management processes with the least privileges necessary and avoid granting them broad OS command capabilities where possible.
  • Segregate the web management interface from untrusted networks (e.g., disable WAN management, use strong authentication and network segmentation).
  • Adopt secure-by-default coding practices for CGIs and management interfaces, treating all external input as untrusted.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-level review with behavioral monitoring:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag direct use of functions that build shell commands from HTTP parameters (e.g., system, popen, execl, sh -c) and concatenation patterns involving user input such as tz.
  • Manual code review: Examine CGI handlers that bridge web requests to OS commands, checking for:
  • String concatenation with request parameters.
  • Lack of input validation or whitelisting for configuration fields.
  • Use of generic shell wrappers instead of parameterized APIs.
  • Firmware and binary analysis: For closed-source components, inspect extracted CGI binaries for command-building logic using taint analysis or instrumentation.
  • Runtime monitoring: Enable logging of unusual command invocations from web server processes and watch for anomalous patterns (e.g., unexpected utilities, outbound connections, or shell control operators).
  • Policy enforcement: Integrate secure coding policies for management interfaces into development and review pipelines, with automated checks where feasible.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Litengzheng/vuldb_new/blob/main/A7100RU/vul_187/README.md
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/792946
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/355516
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/355516/cti
totolink.nettotolink.net/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if the router's management interface is exposed to the WAN or reachable via a routed path.

If management access is limited to the local network, exploitation typically requires being on the same LAN or otherwise gaining local network access.

That depends on the device's configuration.

If the vulnerable endpoint is protected by authentication, an attacker would generally need valid credentials or another way to bypass authentication.

If the endpoint is accessible without authentication due to misconfiguration or design, exploitation may be possible by any remote party who can reach the interface.

Avoid building shell commands from user-supplied data altogether.

Use parameterized system APIs that do not invoke a shell, strictly whitelist permissible values for configuration fields, and centralize input validation logic so all CGI handlers treat external data as untrusted.

Adopt secure coding guidelines for embedded web management components: treat all HTTP parameters as untrusted, enforce rigorous validation and whitelisting, ban direct shell invocation with concatenated strings, and integrate static analysis and security review into the development lifecycle.

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