Summary
9Router's OIDC test endpoint accepts a user-controlled issuer URL and retrieves discovery metadata without restricting requests to private or loopback destinations. When dashboard login is disabled, an unauthenticated attacker may use this behavior to scan internal services and reflect sensitive OIDC fields such as token endpoints and JWKS URLs.
Affected context
The vulnerability can occur in 9Router deployments that expose the POST /api/auth/oidc/test endpoint and allow dashboard login to be disabled. It affects the OIDC discovery flow when the supplied issuer URL is passed to the discovery fetch function without destination validation or network boundary enforcement.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The POST
/api/auth/oidc/testAPI endpoint - Required access: No authentication when dashboard login is disabled
- Trigger point: Processing the user-controlled
issuerUrlparameter - Why exploitation is possible: The server performs outbound discovery requests without adequately restricting private, loopback, or otherwise internal destinations
Why this happens
The underlying issue is server-side request forgery, mapped to CWE-918. The application treats a user-controlled URL as a trusted destination for server-side HTTP requests and does not enforce an allowlist, reject private address ranges, or otherwise constrain the destination before fetching OIDC discovery metadata. The lack of authentication when dashboard login is disabled also relates to CWE-306, because the sensitive request capability may be exposed without an appropriate authentication requirement.
Potential impact
- An attacker may scan internal services from the 9Router server's network position
- Internal service addresses, ports, or response characteristics could be disclosed
- OIDC metadata such as
token_endpointandjwks_urimay be reflected to the attacker - Cloud or platform metadata services could potentially be queried if reachable
- Internal authentication or trust boundaries could be weakened through service discovery
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in user-supplied URLs and enforcing outbound network boundaries.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Restricting OIDC issuer destinations to an explicit, trusted allowlist
- Rejecting loopback, link-local, private, multicast, and reserved address ranges after DNS resolution
- Revalidating destinations across redirects and preventing DNS rebinding
- Requiring authentication and authorization for administrative OIDC testing functions
- Limiting outbound connectivity from the application to only required services
- Returning only the minimum discovery data needed by the client
- Applying network egress controls and least-privilege runtime permissions
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations commonly detect SSRF risks through:
- Static analysis rules identifying user-controlled URLs passed to HTTP clients
- Code review checks for missing URL allowlists, IP-range validation, and redirect controls
- API security tests covering loopback, private, link-local, and cloud metadata destinations
- Egress proxy and firewall logs showing unexpected requests from the application
- Monitoring for unauthenticated use of administrative or diagnostic endpoints
- Policy enforcement requiring authentication for configuration and connectivity-test APIs
Automated security review tools may help identify direct data flows from request parameters into outbound network requests.

