Summary
Capgo exposes a get_orgs_v7(userid) RPC endpoint that can be invoked without authentication or proper authorization checks.
By passing arbitrary user UUIDs, attackers can retrieve other users' organization memberships, roles, management emails, and billing-related metadata under conditions where the endpoint is reachable.
Affected context
The issue occurs in deployments of Capgo where the get_orgs_v7(userid) RPC function is exposed over a network interface and is intended to be private or restricted.
It manifests when the endpoint lacks effective server-side authorization enforcement, allowing any caller who can reach the API to query organization membership and related metadata for arbitrary user identifiers.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Network-accessible RPC interface for get_orgs_v7(userid)
- Required access: None; the vulnerability is exploitable by unauthenticated users who can reach the endpoint
- Trigger point: Invoking get_orgs_v7 with a chosen user UUID in the userid parameter
- Why exploitation is possible: The RPC layer does not enforce authorization checks to ensure that the caller is authenticated and authorized to view the target user's organization and billing metadata
Why this happens
This vulnerability stems from missing or ineffective authorization controls on a sensitive backend RPC endpoint, aligning with CWE-862: Missing Authorization.
The application assumes the endpoint will be used only in authenticated contexts, but the server does not enforce that assumption.
As a result, business logic that returns organization membership, role assignments, management emails, and billing metadata executes for arbitrary user UUIDs supplied by any network client.
Potential impact
- Exposure of organization membership and role assignments for arbitrary users
- Disclosure of management and contact emails associated with organizations
- Leakage of billing-related metadata that may reveal customer segmentation or account status
- Facilitation of targeted phishing, social engineering, or account takeover attempts using organizational and email intelligence
- Indirect mapping of the customer base and internal organizational structures
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation focuses on enforcing robust server-side authorization for all sensitive RPC functions and avoiding assumptions about client trust.
Recommended patterns include:
- Applying centralized access control checks that verify both authentication and authorization before returning any user- or organization-specific data
- Binding queries to the authenticated principal rather than accepting arbitrary user identifiers, or validating that the caller has an appropriate relationship to the requested user
- Minimizing returned data to the least necessary fields and separating billing or administrative metadata into more restricted interfaces
- Using defense-in-depth controls such as API gateways, service meshes, or policy engines to enforce access policies consistently across endpoints
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically involves a combination of code and configuration review:
- Reviewing RPC and controller code paths for endpoints that return user, organization, or billing data without explicit authorization checks
- Using static analysis or custom rules to flag handlers that accept user identifiers from clients but do not validate ownership or permissions
- Examining API gateway logs and access logs for patterns of unauthenticated requests to sensitive endpoints
- Incorporating security tests into CI pipelines that attempt to invoke internal or privileged RPC methods without credentials

