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CVE-2026-56100

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Missing Authorization (CWE-862) in SpringBlade Feign API

CVE-2026-56100

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Privilege Escalation and Unauthorized Account Creation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

SpringBlade versions 2.7.3 through before 5.0.0 contain an authorization flaw in an internal Feign user-creation endpoint exposed through a REST controller. An authenticated attacker who can reach the endpoint, forge an accepted token, or otherwise bypass role checks may create administrator accounts and gain persistent, elevated access.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in SpringBlade deployments where an internal user-creation service is exposed without effective authorization checks. Risk increases when the gateway validates only JWT structure or parsing, when caller identity and roles are not enforced, and when signing material is embedded in publicly accessible application artifacts.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: An exposed REST or Feign-backed user-creation endpoint
  • Required access: Authentication or another means of presenting a token accepted by the gateway
  • Trigger point: A request reaching the user-creation operation without effective role authorization
  • Why exploitation is possible: The request path does not sufficiently verify caller privileges, and exposed or weakly protected signing material may allow tokens to be treated as belonging to a more privileged identity

Why this happens

The underlying bug is a failure to enforce authorization at a sensitive administrative operation, mapping to CWE-862: Missing Authorization. Authentication-related token processing is treated as sufficient even though parsing or accepting a JWT does not establish that the caller is permitted to create administrator accounts. The risk is compounded when signing keys are hardcoded in distributable artifacts, allowing trust decisions to depend on credentials that are not kept confidential.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may create unauthorized system administrator accounts
  • Existing tenant data could be modified or polluted
  • Administrative privileges could support persistent backdoor access
  • Unauthorized users could access or alter cross-tenant information
  • Compromised accounts could enable further application or infrastructure abuse

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization independently at every sensitive operation and reducing trust in client-supplied identity claims.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Applying explicit role- and permission-based checks to user-creation endpoints
  • Ensuring internal Feign routes are not externally reachable unless required
  • Validating token signature, issuer, audience, expiry, subject, and roles using centrally managed trust configuration
  • Removing hardcoded signing secrets from source code and distributable artifacts
  • Storing secrets in protected secret-management systems with controlled rotation
  • Separating administrative account creation from ordinary user workflows
  • Applying least privilege to service identities and tenant-scoped authorization
  • Denying access by default when authorization metadata or caller identity is missing

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches can include:

  • Static analysis searches for REST or Feign endpoints that mutate users without method-level authorization annotations or equivalent policy checks
  • Code review checks that distinguish JWT parsing from authorization and verify role enforcement at the operation boundary
  • Scanning repositories and build artifacts for embedded signing keys or other credential-like constants
  • API inventory reviews identifying internal administrative endpoints exposed through gateways
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected administrator-account creation, unusual token claims, and cross-tenant write activity
  • Policy enforcement requiring authorization tests for privileged endpoint handlers

Automated code review and secret-scanning tools can help identify these patterns during development.

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/sud0why/e73405057dd7414a8c221ef17e0d0059#file-cve-2026-56100-springblade-authbypass-en-md
github.comgithub.com/chillzhuang/SpringBlade
github.comgithub.com/chillzhuang/SpringBlade/commit/c69b9547c942c697da2f3ee6a9265b6004abd645
github.comgithub.com/chillzhuang/SpringBlade/releases#release-v5.0.0
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/springblade-privilege-escalation-via-exposed-feign-endpoint

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable when the affected endpoint is reachable through the application gateway and the attacker can satisfy its authentication or token-acceptance requirements.

The described path generally requires an authenticated low-privilege account or another way to present a token accepted by the gateway. Exposure of signing material can broaden the practical scope of access.

Enforce deny-by-default, role-aware authorization directly on the user-creation operation, and validate token trust and claims using protected, centrally managed keys.

Maintain an inventory of privileged endpoints, require authorization-focused tests and reviews, keep secrets out of artifacts, and monitor administrative account creation and cross-tenant activity.

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