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CVE-2026-56078

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Path Traversal (CWE-22) in PraisonAI MultiAgentMonitor

CVE-2026-56078

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Arbitrary File Read/Write and Potential Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

PraisonAI MultiAgentMonitor before 1.5.115 contains a path traversal flaw in how it builds file paths from unsanitized agent IDs.

By embedding traversal sequences such as "../" in agent identifiers, an attacker can potentially read, write, or overwrite unintended files, creating risks of sensitive data disclosure, denial of service, or even code execution depending on deployment.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in deployments that rely on the MultiAgentMonitor component of PraisonAI, where agent identifiers are accepted from internal or external sources and used to construct file system paths.

It is most relevant when:

  • Agent IDs originate from user-controlled or indirectly controllable input
  • The MultiAgentMonitor has access to sensitive directories or executable code paths
  • File operations (read, write, or overwrite) occur without directory confinement or canonicalization checks

In such configurations, path traversal via crafted agent IDs can cross directory boundaries and reach files outside the intended storage area.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Interfaces that accept or manipulate agent IDs used by MultiAgentMonitor (APIs, UI forms, internal messaging, or automation hooks).
  • Required access: Ability to supply or influence an agent ID value processed by the monitoring logic; network or local access depends on how PraisonAI is exposed.
  • Trigger point: Any MultiAgentMonitor operation that constructs file paths from agent IDs (e.g., logging, state persistence, metrics storage, or agent output files).
  • Why exploitation is possible: The component concatenates agent IDs directly into filesystem paths without normalizing, validating, or constraining them to an expected directory, allowing traversal sequences such as "../" to escape the intended directory.

Why this happens

The root cause is improper restriction of pathname to a limited directory, aligned with CWE-22 (Path Traversal).

MultiAgentMonitor appears to treat agent IDs as trustworthy path segments and performs simple string concatenation or interpolation when building file paths, without:

  • Canonicalizing the resulting path
  • Rejecting traversal tokens like "../" or absolute path prefixes
  • Enforcing a root directory or sandbox boundary

This insecure pattern allows attacker-controlled identifiers to influence which filesystem locations are accessed, breaking assumptions about isolation between agents and the host environment.

Potential impact

  • May allow reading sensitive configuration files, logs, or data belonging to other agents or system components.
  • Could enable overwriting or deleting important application or system files, leading to denial of service.
  • Can permit placing or modifying executable scripts or configuration, potentially enabling code execution in some environments.
  • Might expose secrets (API keys, credentials, tokens) stored on disk, increasing risk of broader compromise.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on constraining how identifiers are translated into filesystem paths and minimizing the privileges of file operations.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Treating agent IDs as opaque identifiers and validating them against a strict whitelist of allowed characters and formats (e.g., alphanumeric with limited separators).
  • Normalizing and canonicalizing constructed paths, then enforcing that they remain inside a predefined base directory before performing any file operations.
  • Using high-level storage abstractions (e.g., key-value stores or database-backed state) instead of direct filesystem paths derived from user input.
  • Applying least-privilege principles so the MultiAgentMonitor runs under an account with access only to required directories, not system-wide paths.
  • Maintaining separate storage areas per tenant or environment to reduce the blast radius if path traversal is attempted.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves both code-level and operational approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag string concatenation or interpolation where user-controlled identifiers are used in filesystem APIs (open, read, write, delete) without prior validation or canonicalization.
  • Code review: Look for functions in MultiAgentMonitor and related modules that handle agent IDs; verify they enforce an allowlist of characters, reject traversal patterns, and confirm constructed paths stay within an expected root directory.
  • Runtime monitoring: Use file integrity monitoring or audit logs to detect unexpected file access patterns (e.g., accesses to sensitive system paths originating from the PraisonAI process).
  • Policy enforcement: Integrate security checks into CI/CD pipelines so changes affecting path construction undergo additional scrutiny or automated scanning using SAST tools.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
github.comgithub.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-arbitrary-file-read-and-write-via-path-traversal-in-multiagentmonitor

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on where agent IDs come from and how widely the PraisonAI service is exposed. If untrusted users can influence agent IDs and the service runs with broad filesystem access, the exposure can be significant.

The attacker needs some way to provide or manipulate agent IDs used by MultiAgentMonitor. In some deployments this may require authenticated access; in others, agent IDs might be influenced indirectly via integrations or upstream services.

The safest pattern is to decouple user-controlled identifiers from raw filesystem paths: validate agent IDs against a strict allowlist, construct paths using safe APIs anchored to a fixed base directory, canonicalize the result, and reject any path that attempts to leave the allowed directory.

Adopt coding standards that forbid direct concatenation of untrusted input into file paths, require canonicalization and directory confinement checks, and mandate security-focused code review for any feature that interacts with the filesystem based on external identifiers.

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