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CVE-2026-55976

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

SSRF (CWE-918) in Apache Hive Avro SerDe Schema Fetch

CVE-2026-55976

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Unauthorized server-side network access and potential sensitive data exposure

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A server-side request forgery vulnerability in Apache Hive's Avro SerDe schema resolution can cause Hive to fetch an attacker-controlled URL while querying an Avro table. An authenticated user with table-creation privileges may use this behavior to reach cloud metadata services, internal network endpoints, or local resources available to the Hive process.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Hive deployments that use Avro tables and resolve schemas through the avro.schema.url table property. It becomes risky when an authenticated remote user can create or alter a table, set that property to an attacker-controlled location, and cause the table to be queried. External tables are commonly relevant because they allow table metadata to reference resources outside the managed data path.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible HiveServer2 or Metastore services
  • Required access: Valid Hive authentication and CREATE TABLE or equivalent DDL privilege
  • Trigger point: Avro schema resolution when the affected table is queried
  • Additional access: The table creator can typically query the created table; another user with SELECT access may also trigger resolution
  • Why exploitation is possible: Hive resolves a user-influenced schema URL from table metadata and performs a server-side fetch using the Hive process identity
  • Not required: Write access to the table location or administrative privileges

Why this happens

The vulnerability results from treating a table property that can be controlled by a sufficiently privileged user as a trusted network resource. During Avro schema resolution, Hive follows the configured URL from the server side without adequately restricting destinations or schemes. This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, where attacker-influenced input causes a server to make requests to unintended local, internal, or external resources.

Potential impact

  • Exposure of cloud instance metadata or temporary credentials
  • Access to internal network services reachable by the Hive host
  • Disclosure of local files or service responses available to the Hive process
  • Network reconnaissance from a trusted server location
  • Potential follow-on compromise if retrieved data contains credentials or sensitive configuration

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in schema locations and restricting outbound connectivity from Hive services.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Permit only approved schema schemes and trusted hostnames or repositories
  • Reject loopback, link-local, private, and otherwise restricted destination ranges after resolving hostnames
  • Avoid allowing arbitrary remote URLs in table metadata when managed schema storage is available
  • Apply network egress controls that prevent Hive processes from reaching metadata services and unnecessary internal networks
  • Run HiveServer2 and related services with least-privilege identities and minimal filesystem access
  • Treat external-table and schema-location privileges as sensitive capabilities
  • Centralize and audit schema distribution through authenticated, allowlisted repositories

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine metadata inspection, application logging, and network telemetry:

  • Search metastore metadata for Avro tables whose avro.schema.url uses unexpected http, https, file, or ftp schemes
  • Flag URLs targeting link-local addresses, cloud metadata endpoints, private network ranges, localhost, or unusual internal hosts
  • Review HiveServer2 and Metastore logs for CREATE TABLE or ALTER TABLE operations that set schema URLs, followed by queries against those tables
  • Correlate schema-resolution failures and outbound requests with the identity that created or modified the table
  • Monitor flow logs and metadata-service access logs for requests originating from Hive host identities
  • Use static analysis and policy checks to identify unrestricted URL fetching or missing destination validation in schema-resolution code

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/apache/hive
github.comgithub.com/apache/hive/commit/45049202df35cea382616624de3fe8d252aa2d00
issues.apache.orgissues.apache.org/jira/browse/HIVE-29671
lists.apache.orglists.apache.org/thread/6d56mk501fp4f8cb5wvrpj2jwd9knt05

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. A remote attacker may exploit it when HiveServer2 or the Metastore is network-accessible and the attacker has valid authentication plus the required table-creation privilege.

No. Administrative or superuser access is not generally required. The important prerequisite is permission to create or equivalently modify table metadata containing avro.schema.url.

Restrict schema resolution to approved repositories and destinations, reject local and internal address ranges, and enforce outbound network controls for Hive processes.

Treat user-influenced URLs as untrusted, apply scheme and destination allowlists, limit DDL privileges, use managed schema storage, and monitor metadata changes together with server-side network activity.

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