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CVE-2026-55874

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

Path Traversal (CWE-22) in SeaweedFS S3 Copy API

CVE-2026-55874

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Cross-Bucket Data Access / Authorization Bypass

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

SeaweedFS's S3 gateway previously failed to reject dot-dot path segments in the X-Amz-Copy-Source header for CopyObject and UploadPartCopy operations.

Under certain configurations, an authenticated identity restricted to one bucket could use server-side copy to read objects from other buckets, bypassing intended bucket scoping.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears when SeaweedFS is deployed with its S3 API gateway and uses bucket-scoped identities or policies to restrict access.

The issue involves server-side copy operations (CopyObject and UploadPartCopy) that rely on the X-Amz-Copy-Source header to identify source objects.

When validation of path segments in this header is insufficient, specially crafted values may allow identities confined to a single bucket to indirectly access objects in other buckets.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: SeaweedFS S3 API gateway endpoints handling CopyObject and UploadPartCopy requests
  • Required access: Valid authenticated S3-style credentials with access limited (by policy) to a specific bucket
  • Trigger point: Sending a server-side copy request with a crafted X-Amz-Copy-Source header containing dot-dot (..) segments
  • Why exploitation is possible: The gateway's path normalization does not properly reject traversal-style segments within the copy source path, allowing resolution beyond the intended bucket boundary

Why this happens

The root cause aligns with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ("Path Traversal").

The S3 gateway logic trusts the structure of the X-Amz-Copy-Source header without robust normalization and restriction of path segments.

By permitting .. components in the copy source, the server's internal path resolution can escape the bucket-relative namespace that policies intend to enforce, resulting in unintended cross-bucket object visibility.

Potential impact

  • An identity scoped to a single bucket may read objects from other buckets via server-side copy
  • Bucket-level isolation and access controls can be undermined
  • Sensitive data stored in adjacent buckets could be exposed to unauthorized internal tenants
  • Compliance and data segregation guarantees may be weakened

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on strict path handling and enforcing namespace boundaries in API request processing.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Normalizing and validating all user-controlled path inputs, especially headers like X-Amz-Copy-Source
  • Explicitly rejecting dot-dot (..) and similar traversal segments in any bucket or object path evaluation
  • Implementing clear separation between bucket namespaces and verifying that server-side copy sources belong to the requesting identity's allowed buckets
  • Applying defense-in-depth authorization checks at the object level, not solely at bucket boundaries
  • Designing APIs so that copy operations require explicit, policy-verified source and destination identifiers instead of free-form paths

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect path traversal and authorization bypass issues through several approaches:

  • Static analysis rules and code scanning tuned to identify unvalidated path concatenation and missing normalization around S3-style headers
  • Manual code review focusing on any feature that performs server-side copy, rename, or move using user-supplied paths
  • Logging and monitoring for anomalous CopyObject / UploadPartCopy requests that reference unexpected buckets or complex path patterns with ..
  • Policy-based checks in CI/CD that require path validation wrappers or utility functions for all storage gateway operations
  • Use of automated security testing tools or custom integration tests that attempt traversal via X-Amz-Copy-Source and similar headers

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/commit/b44cf51fe931bd75aa4d37ae766bea90d7f85ccd
github.comgithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/pull/9929
github.comgithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/releases/tag/4.34
github.comgithub.com/seaweedfs/seaweedfs/security/advisories/GHSA-56wq-x3wv-3ff4

Frequently asked

questions

No. The issue is limited to improper path handling and authorization, enabling data access across buckets; it does not directly lead to code execution.

An attacker must possess valid S3-style credentials that are nominally restricted to at least one bucket. The vulnerability then allows extending that access to other buckets via crafted copy operations.

Enforce strict path normalization and validation for all user-supplied paths, reject traversal constructs such as .., and verify that any server-side copy source resides within the requester's authorized bucket and object namespace.

Adopt a consistent input-validation framework for path-like parameters, perform object-level authorization checks, include path traversal tests in automated security testing, and require code reviews for any change that manipulates resource identifiers or filesystem-like paths.

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