Summary
WeGIA contains a SQL injection vulnerability in a billing-update endpoint that accepts an unvalidated codigo parameter from unauthenticated POST requests. An attacker may execute arbitrary SQL to read or modify database records, including credential hashes and billing information.
WeGIA contains a SQL injection vulnerability in a billing-update endpoint that accepts an unvalidated codigo parameter from unauthenticated POST requests. An attacker may execute arbitrary SQL to read or modify database records, including credential hashes and billing information.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in WeGIA's billing-management functionality when the
cadastro_cobranca.php endpoint processes the codigo parameter. Risk is
present when the endpoint is reachable without authentication and user-
controlled request data is incorporated into an SQL UPDATE statement without
parameter binding or equivalent validation.
The vulnerability occurs in WeGIA's billing-management functionality when the
cadastro_cobranca.php endpoint processes the codigo parameter. Risk is
present when the endpoint is reachable without authentication and user-
controlled request data is incorporated into an SQL UPDATE statement without
parameter binding or equivalent validation.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The web application's billing update endpoint
- Required access: Ability to send unauthenticated HTTP POST requests
- Trigger point: Processing of the
codigoparameter in the billing update workflow - Why exploitation is possible: Request parameters are imported into application variables and incorporated into a SQL
WHERE codigo=...clause without prepared statements or effective input validation
- Attack surface: The web application's billing update endpoint
- Required access: Ability to send unauthenticated HTTP POST requests
- Trigger point: Processing of the
codigoparameter in the billing update workflow - Why exploitation is possible: Request parameters are imported into application variables and incorporated into a SQL
WHERE codigo=...clause without prepared statements or effective input validation
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an SQL injection flaw caused by combining request-derived
data with SQL syntax. The use of extract($_REQUEST) expands attacker-
controlled parameters into application variables, while the resulting value is
inserted into an UPDATE statement without parameter binding. Quoted input can
preserve SQL expression semantics instead of being safely treated as a typed
value, mapping this behavior to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command.
The underlying bug is an SQL injection flaw caused by combining request-derived
data with SQL syntax. The use of extract($_REQUEST) expands attacker-
controlled parameters into application variables, while the resulting value is
inserted into an UPDATE statement without parameter binding. Quoted input can
preserve SQL expression semantics instead of being safely treated as a typed
value, mapping this behavior to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command.
Potential impact
- An attacker may read sensitive database content
- An attacker could modify or delete billing records
- Credential hashes and other account-related data may be exposed
- Database integrity and application trust relationships could be compromised
- The vulnerability can enable broader compromise if database privileges are excessive
- An attacker may read sensitive database content
- An attacker could modify or delete billing records
- Credential hashes and other account-related data may be exposed
- Database integrity and application trust relationships could be compromised
- The vulnerability can enable broader compromise if database privileges are excessive
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally centers on separating data from SQL commands and reducing
the trust placed in request parameters.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for every database operation
- Avoid broad request-to-variable mechanisms such as
extract($_REQUEST) - Apply allowlisted validation and strict type handling for identifier fields
- Enforce authentication and authorization before billing-data updates
- Limit database accounts to the minimum permissions required by the application
- Use centralized input handling and secure database-access abstractions
- Protect sensitive records through layered access controls and monitoring
Mitigation generally centers on separating data from SQL commands and reducing
the trust placed in request parameters.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for every database operation
- Avoid broad request-to-variable mechanisms such as
extract($_REQUEST) - Apply allowlisted validation and strict type handling for identifier fields
- Enforce authentication and authorization before billing-data updates
- Limit database accounts to the minimum permissions required by the application
- Use centralized input handling and secure database-access abstractions
- Protect sensitive records through layered access controls and monitoring
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis rules for SQL statements built through string concatenation or interpolation
- Checks for request-variable extraction and direct use of superglobal input in database calls
- Code review searches for missing prepared statements and inconsistent identifier validation
- Dynamic testing with SQL metacharacter probes in parameters that reach database queries
- Web-application firewall or gateway policies that detect suspicious SQL syntax while recognizing that filtering is not a primary fix
- Database audit logging for unexpected updates, reads, or schema-related activity
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis rules for SQL statements built through string concatenation or interpolation
- Checks for request-variable extraction and direct use of superglobal input in database calls
- Code review searches for missing prepared statements and inconsistent identifier validation
- Dynamic testing with SQL metacharacter probes in parameters that reach database queries
- Web-application firewall or gateway policies that detect suspicious SQL syntax while recognizing that filtering is not a primary fix
- Database audit logging for unexpected updates, reads, or schema-related activity
