/

CVE-2026-55658

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

Missing Authorization (CWE-862) in Gardens Streaming

CVE-2026-55658

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Unauthorized transfer and potential loss of pool funds

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Gardens v2 can leave pool-funded streaming escrow balances parked after a streaming proposal is canceled or completes. Because claim() is permissionless and forwards the escrow's full balance to a beneficiary selected by the proposal submitter, an unauthorized party may redirect funds that should return to the governance pool.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Gardens v2 streaming proposal workflows when real pool funds are moved into a StreamingEscrow to support a Superfluid constant flow agreement. If the proposal is canceled or reaches natural completion, the escrow balance may remain available while the normal recovery path is not invoked. The risk is greatest when claim() can be called without authorization and the beneficiary is controlled by the proposal submitter.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Permissionless interaction with the streaming proposal and escrow contracts
  • Required access: Ability to invoke the publicly accessible claim() function; proposal-submission privileges may be needed to select a beneficiary
  • Trigger point: Claiming funds from an escrow after cancellation or completion of a streaming proposal
  • Why exploitation is possible: The escrow's full balance can be forwarded to the beneficiary, while cancellation does not reclaim the pool-funded buffer and the recovery function is restricted to a strategy-controlled dispute path

Why this happens

The vulnerability is caused by missing authorization and incomplete escrow-state handling. The cancellation flow removes the escrow's GDA member units but does not transfer the remaining pool-funded balance back to the pool. A permissionless claim() operation can then release that balance to the proposal beneficiary, including funds that were intended to remain under pool control. This behavior maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, because a state-changing asset transfer is available without verifying that the caller or recipient is entitled to receive the parked funds.

Potential impact

  • An attacker or beneficiary may receive pool-funded escrow reserves
  • Governance pool assets could be permanently diverted
  • Communities may experience financial loss or reduced funds available for governance
  • Repeatedly affected proposals could increase cumulative fund depletion
  • Dispute, cancellation, and streaming accounting may become inconsistent

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every escrow release path and ensuring that lifecycle transitions reconcile all reserved funds.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Restricting claim operations to an explicitly authorized caller or validated beneficiary
  • Returning unused deposits, margins, and parked balances to the originating pool during cancellation and completion
  • Separating beneficiary payments from pool-owned escrow reserves
  • Making escrow accounting invariant checks enforce that no pool balance remains stranded after proposal termination
  • Applying least-privilege roles to strategy and treasury operations
  • Using fail-closed state transitions when a proposal changes from active to canceled, rejected, or completed

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for:

  • Static analysis identifying permissionless functions that transfer contract-held assets
  • Code review signals where cancellation clears accounting units without moving or reconciling the underlying balance
  • Tests covering canceled, rejected, expired, and naturally completed proposals with nonzero escrow balances
  • Invariant checks comparing pool debits, escrow balances, and beneficiary credits across every proposal lifecycle
  • Policy enforcement requiring authorization checks for asset-release functions and coverage for all terminal states
  • Runtime monitoring for claims whose value exceeds the intended stream settlement or follows proposal cancellation

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/1Hive/gardens-v2/security/advisories/GHSA-jwvq-5xmf-f377

Frequently asked

questions

It can be exploited through blockchain contract interactions rather than by accessing a server. The relevant contracts must be deployed and the affected proposal lifecycle must leave funds in the escrow.

The claim() path is described as permissionless, so privileged contract access may not be required to invoke it. Selecting the beneficiary generally depends on proposal-submission rights, but an existing proposal may still expose funds to its configured beneficiary.

Enforce authorization on escrow claims and reconcile every escrow balance during cancellation and natural completion, returning pool-owned funds before allowing beneficiary payment.

Model all terminal proposal states explicitly, test balance invariants for each transition, and require code review or automated analysis for permissionless functions that transfer contract-held assets.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.