Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

SQL Injection in Simple Laundry System /searchguest.php

CVE-2026-5564

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-89

Impact:

Data Exposure and Manipulation via SQL Injection

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Simple Laundry System 1.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the searchguest.php endpoint, where the searchServiceId parameter is passed into database queries without proper sanitization.

A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to alter SQL logic, potentially accessing or modifying backend data, especially when the application runs with overly broad database privileges.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in the web-facing searchguest.php script of the Simple Laundry System 1.0 application, specifically in the parameter handling logic for searchServiceId.

It manifests when user-supplied input is interpolated into SQL statements without robust validation, type enforcement, or parameterization.

Any deployment that exposes this endpoint over a network and connects it to a relational database using dynamically constructed queries may be affected, depending on schema, roles, and database configuration.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP interface of the Simple Laundry System, particularly requests reaching /searchguest.php.
  • Required access: Network access to the web application (no prior authentication is necessarily required, depending on how the route is protected).
  • Trigger point: Supplying crafted values in the searchServiceId parameter that are incorporated into SQL queries.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The parameter handler directly embeds user-controlled input into SQL statements without parameterized queries or sufficient sanitization, enabling attackers to modify query structure.

Why this happens

The core issue is improper neutralization of user input before it is used in dynamically built SQL queries.

The parameter handler for searchServiceId likely concatenates raw request data into query strings instead of using prepared statements or strict type casting.

This aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), and is related to CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component, since the database is a downstream consumer of the tainted data.

In abstract terms, the design trusts external input as query syntax rather than treating it purely as data, allowing attackers to break out of the intended query structure.

Potential impact

  • Retrieval of sensitive customer or service data that would normally be access-controlled.
  • Modification or deletion of records in the laundry management database.
  • Creation of new records or escalation of application state beyond intended workflows.
  • In some configurations, execution of database-specific functions that could aid further compromise.
  • Loss of data integrity, leading to inaccurate business records and reporting.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation efforts should focus on ensuring that user input cannot alter the structure of SQL queries.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Using parameterized queries / prepared statements for all database access involving user input.
  • Enforcing strict server-side validation and type checking for ID-like parameters such as searchServiceId (e.g., integer-only).
  • Centralizing parameter handling so that input is normalized and validated at a single choke point before reaching data access logic.
  • Applying least-privilege principles to the database account used by the application, limiting what can be read, written, or executed if injection occurs.
  • Avoiding dynamic SQL construction where possible; when dynamic behavior is required, whitelisting allowed values and query fragments.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this class of issue using a combination of automated and manual techniques:

  • Static analysis rules that flag string concatenation or interpolation used to build SQL queries, especially where parameters flow directly from HTTP request variables.
  • Code review practices that require inspection of all database access layers for consistent use of prepared statements and validation routines.
  • Runtime security testing and fuzzing that send crafted inputs in searchServiceId to detect anomalous query behavior or error messages.
  • Web application firewalls (WAF) or API gateways configured with rules to detect and log common SQL injection patterns for further investigation.

Sources

SourceLink
code-projects.orgcode-projects.org/
github.comgithub.com/Kazamikazu/Ksec/issues/2
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/782976
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/355334
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/355334/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. As long as the /searchguest.php endpoint is reachable over the network, an attacker can attempt to exploit the SQL injection by sending crafted HTTP requests.

Not necessarily. Exploitability depends on how the application routes and protects searchguest.php. If the route is publicly accessible, no authentication is required; if it is behind a login, valid credentials would be needed.

The most robust fix is to refactor all affected queries to use parameterized statements and strict type enforcement, ensuring that searchServiceId and similar parameters are treated as data-only inputs, not query syntax.

Adopting a consistent data access layer that enforces prepared statements by default, implementing centralized input validation, conducting regular secure code reviews, and integrating static and dynamic security testing into the development lifecycle help prevent similar SQL injection flaws.

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