Summary
Incus contains missing authorization checks in the custom-volume copy operation, allowing an attacker to copy a volume from a project they cannot access into a project they control or can access. If the attacker knows the source project and volume names and can invoke the relevant Incus operation, secrets and other sensitive data stored in the volume may be exposed.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Incus environments where users can perform custom-volume copy operations across projects. Risk is present when the operation accepts a source project and volume without consistently verifying that the requesting principal is authorized to read the source volume. The attacker must also be able to interact with the Incus management interface and know identifying information for the targeted resources.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Incus management API or another interface that exposes custom-volume copying
- Required access: Authenticated or otherwise permitted access to invoke volume-management operations, depending on deployment configuration
- Known information: The name of a project and custom volume belonging to a project the attacker cannot access
- Trigger point: A custom-volume copy request referencing the unauthorized source project and volume
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks do not adequately confirm read access to the source project and volume before copying their contents
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization failure in a cross-project resource operation. The copy workflow validates that the requested resources can be addressed but does not reliably enforce the caller's permissions on the source project and custom volume. This behavior maps to CWE-284: Improper Access Control, because a protected resource can be transferred through an operation that lacks an effective authorization decision.
Potential impact
- Sensitive files and secrets in custom volumes may be disclosed
- Confidential application or tenant data could be copied into an accessible project
- Unauthorized users may gain persistent access to replicated data
- Cross-tenant isolation could be weakened
- Exposed credentials could enable further compromise of connected systems
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every resource boundary and operation stage.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require explicit read permission on the source project and custom volume before allowing a copy
- Revalidate authorization for both source and destination resources during the operation
- Apply deny-by-default policies for cross-project volume transfers
- Use narrowly scoped identities and least-privilege project permissions
- Avoid relying on resource-name knowledge as evidence of authorization
- Log and review cross-project copy attempts, including denied requests
- Isolate sensitive data in projects with restrictive management policies
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static and authorization-focused analysis of handlers for copy, clone, move, and export operations
- Code review checks confirming permissions on both source and destination resources
- Tests that attempt cross-project operations using identities lacking source-resource permissions
- Policy enforcement that denies cross-project transfers unless explicitly allowed
- Audit-log monitoring for successful volume copies involving projects outside the caller's normal scope
- Automated security review tools that identify missing authorization checks at resource boundaries

