Summary
Pheditor versions 2.0.1 through 2.0.5 ship with a hardcoded default admin password and do not require users to change it on first login.
Any internet-exposed instance that retains these default credentials may allow attackers full access to file editing, upload, and terminal features, leading to arbitrary file modification and remote code execution.
Pheditor versions 2.0.1 through 2.0.5 ship with a hardcoded default admin password and do not require users to change it on first login.
Any internet-exposed instance that retains these default credentials may allow attackers full access to file editing, upload, and terminal features, leading to arbitrary file modification and remote code execution.
Affected context
This weakness appears in Pheditor deployments that:
- Are running versions 2.0.1 through 2.0.5
- Use the built-in authentication mechanism without changing the default admin password
- Expose the editor over a network where untrusted users can reach the login page
In such contexts, the hardcoded credential effectively becomes a shared secret across all installations, eroding meaningful access control.
This weakness appears in Pheditor deployments that:
- Are running versions 2.0.1 through 2.0.5
- Use the built-in authentication mechanism without changing the default admin password
- Expose the editor over a network where untrusted users can reach the login page
In such contexts, the hardcoded credential effectively becomes a shared secret across all installations, eroding meaningful access control.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface of the Pheditor instance
- Required access: Network access to the Pheditor login page; no prior authentication needed if default credentials are unchanged
- Trigger point: Successful login using the public default admin password
- Why exploitation is possible: The application ships with a known, hardcoded admin password and offers no mandatory password change workflow, allowing attackers to reuse public knowledge to gain administrative access.
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) interface of the Pheditor instance
- Required access: Network access to the Pheditor login page; no prior authentication needed if default credentials are unchanged
- Trigger point: Successful login using the public default admin password
- Why exploitation is possible: The application ships with a known, hardcoded admin password and offers no mandatory password change workflow, allowing attackers to reuse public knowledge to gain administrative access.
Why this happens
The core issue is the use of a hardcoded credential for an administrative account, mapping directly to CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials.
Instead of generating unique secrets or enforcing per-deployment configuration, the application embeds a fixed password hash in the source code and does not prompt or require users to replace it.
This creates a single global password that can be trivially discovered, rendering authentication ineffective whenever the default remains in place.
The core issue is the use of a hardcoded credential for an administrative account, mapping directly to CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials.
Instead of generating unique secrets or enforcing per-deployment configuration, the application embeds a fixed password hash in the source code and does not prompt or require users to replace it.
This creates a single global password that can be trivially discovered, rendering authentication ineffective whenever the default remains in place.
Potential impact
- Attackers may gain full administrative access to the Pheditor instance.
- They could read, modify, and delete application and site files.
- They can upload arbitrary files, including web shells or backdoors.
- They may execute commands via terminal-like features, enabling remote code execution.
- They could pivot to compromise the underlying server or other applications sharing the same environment.
- Attackers may gain full administrative access to the Pheditor instance.
- They could read, modify, and delete application and site files.
- They can upload arbitrary files, including web shells or backdoors.
- They may execute commands via terminal-like features, enabling remote code execution.
- They could pivot to compromise the underlying server or other applications sharing the same environment.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating shared, hardcoded secrets and tightening access control around administration interfaces.
Recommended patterns include:
- Replacing hardcoded passwords with configuration-driven secrets that must be set per deployment.
- Enforcing a mandatory password change on first login or during installation.
- Supporting environment-based secret management (e.g., environment variables, secret stores) rather than embedding values in code.
- Restricting exposure of admin interfaces to trusted networks or protected VPN segments.
- Applying least-privilege principles to filesystem and execution permissions so that an editor account cannot modify or execute sensitive files by default.
Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating shared, hardcoded secrets and tightening access control around administration interfaces.
Recommended patterns include:
- Replacing hardcoded passwords with configuration-driven secrets that must be set per deployment.
- Enforcing a mandatory password change on first login or during installation.
- Supporting environment-based secret management (e.g., environment variables, secret stores) rather than embedding values in code.
- Restricting exposure of admin interfaces to trusted networks or protected VPN segments.
- Applying least-privilege principles to filesystem and execution permissions so that an editor account cannot modify or execute sensitive files by default.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection generally relies on both code-level and configuration-level checks:
- Static analysis or code review rules that flag hardcoded credential patterns, such as fixed password hashes or keys in source files.
- Deployment audits that verify unique admin credentials per instance and detect default or weak passwords.
- Security scanning of web-facing services to identify endpoints protected only by known default credentials.
- Policy enforcement in CI/CD pipelines requiring removal of hardcoded secrets and validating that administrative passwords are configurable and rotated.
Detection generally relies on both code-level and configuration-level checks:
- Static analysis or code review rules that flag hardcoded credential patterns, such as fixed password hashes or keys in source files.
- Deployment audits that verify unique admin credentials per instance and detect default or weak passwords.
- Security scanning of web-facing services to identify endpoints protected only by known default credentials.
- Policy enforcement in CI/CD pipelines requiring removal of hardcoded secrets and validating that administrative passwords are configurable and rotated.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
