Summary
Yamcs contains missing authorization checks in several index, COP-1, and time-management APIs. An authenticated low-privilege user may read telemetry metadata, alter link state, or manipulate simulation time when the deployment exposes these operations without the required privileges.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Yamcs deployments where authenticated users can invoke affected API operations without corresponding object or system privilege enforcement. Relevant functionality includes packet and event index listing, COP-1 link management, and simulation-time control; the practical risk depends on enabled services, assigned roles, and the surrounding mission-control configuration.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Yamcs API endpoints for indexes, COP-1 control, and simulation time
- Required access: An authenticated account with otherwise limited privileges
- Trigger point: Invocation of an affected API operation
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoints may perform sensitive actions or disclose metadata without verifying the required object or system authorization privileges
Why this happens
The underlying defect is an authorization enforcement gap. Sensitive API handlers rely on authentication or general endpoint availability without consistently checking the specific privileges required for reading packet and event indexes, controlling links, or setting simulation time. This behavior maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, in which an application fails to enforce access controls for a protected resource or operation.
Potential impact
- An authenticated low-privilege user may disclose packet and event index metadata
- An unauthorized user could alter COP-1 link state
- Telecommand handling may be disrupted
- Simulation-dependent operations could be affected by unauthorized time changes
- System integrity or availability could be reduced
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally centers on enforcing authorization at every sensitive API handler rather than relying only on authentication or client-side restrictions.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Applying the required object and system privileges consistently to each operation
- Denying access by default when a privilege decision is missing or ambiguous
- Centralizing authorization checks so new endpoints inherit consistent enforcement
- Separating read-only telemetry metadata access from operational control permissions
- Assigning mission-control roles according to least privilege
- Treating simulation-time and link-state changes as high-impact operations requiring explicit authorization
- Recording authorization decisions and sensitive state changes for accountability
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and review rules that identify API handlers lacking authorization guards
- Code review checks comparing endpoint behavior with declared object and system privileges
- Endpoint inventories that map sensitive operations to required roles and permissions
- Integration tests using low-privilege accounts to verify denial of unauthorized reads and state changes
- Policy enforcement requiring authorization coverage for APIs that expose telemetry metadata or control mission state
- Audit-log review for unexpected index access, COP-1 transitions, or simulation-time changes

