Summary
A DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in AutoGPT's signup flow allows untrusted URL parameters to influence client-side navigation and script execution.
When a victim follows a crafted link while authenticated, the next parameter can trigger a client-side redirect that executes attacker-controlled JavaScript in their browser.
Affected context
This vulnerability appears in the web-based signup flow of AutoGPT, where a next URL parameter is used to determine post-signup navigation.
The issue arises when the application passes the unvalidated next parameter directly into router.push or related client-side routing logic.
Risk is highest when authenticated users follow externally supplied links containing a crafted next value, especially in environments where the application has access to sensitive data or internal endpoints.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Web browser, via AutoGPT's public signup page.
- Required access: Ability to persuade an authenticated user (or a user who will become authenticated) to click a crafted URL containing a malicious
nextparameter. - Trigger point: Loading the signup page with the attacker-controlled
nextparameter, which is processed by client-side JavaScript and passed torouter.push. - Why exploitation is possible: The client-side code implicitly trusts the
nextparameter, allowing it to influence navigation and DOM context without robust validation, enabling DOM-based XSS or open redirect behavior that can be chained to script execution.
Why this happens
The core issue is trusting unvalidated, attacker-controlled URL parameters inside client-side routing logic.
By feeding the next parameter directly into router.push, the code allows untrusted data to control navigation and potentially inject behavior into the DOM or script context.
This corresponds to CWE-87: Improper Neutralization of Alternate XSS Syntax and is closely related to CWE-601: Open Redirect, where navigation targets are derived from untrusted input.
The abstract pattern is: client-side scripts consuming URL parameters without validation or normalization, and using them in security-sensitive operations such as redirects or DOM updates.
Potential impact
- Attacker-controlled JavaScript execution in the victim's browser.
- Theft of session tokens, API keys stored in browser storage, or other sensitive data accessible to the web application.
- Unauthorized actions performed on behalf of the victim, such as modifying workflows, configurations, or agent behavior.
- Use of the victim's browser as a pivot point to reach internal network resources accessible only from their environment.
- Phishing or UI redress attacks that present deceptive content within the trusted application origin.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on minimizing trust in URL-derived data and constraining client-side navigation behavior.
Recommended defensive patterns include:
- Treat all URL parameters, including
nextorredirectvalues, as untrusted and validate them against a strict allowlist of known-safe paths. - Normalize and sanitize navigation targets before passing them into
router.pushor similar routing APIs, ensuring they cannot escape the application's origin or inject script-like payloads. - Prefer framework-level routing helpers that enforce same-origin and path-only redirects, avoiding direct use of untrusted strings in navigation calls.
- Apply a robust Content Security Policy (CSP) to reduce the impact of any remaining XSS bugs (e.g., disallow
unsafe-inline, restrict script sources). - Design flows so that redirect targets are stored on the server side (e.g., in a short-lived token) rather than taken directly from query parameters.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can rely on a mix of automated analysis and focused code review:
- Static application security testing (SAST) rules that flag uses of
router.push,window.location, or similar APIs when their arguments originate fromlocation.search,location.hash,URLSearchParams, or other user-controlled inputs. - Code review checklists that require explicit validation for any
next,redirect, orreturn_toparameters and confirm they are constrained to relative, application-internal paths. - Dynamic application security testing (DAST) and browser-based security scanning that fuzz URL parameters to detect unexpected script execution or open redirects.
- Security linting or custom ESLint rules in front-end repositories to warn when untrusted input influences navigation, DOM sinks, or
eval-like constructs.

