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CVE-2026-54652

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Log Exposure & Priv Esc (CWE-269) in Frigate API

CVE-2026-54652

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Privilege Escalation via Sensitive Log Exposure

CWE:

CWE-269, CWE-532, CWE-598, CWE-863

Impact:

Viewer-to-admin privilege escalation and credential disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Frigate's GET /api/logs/{service} endpoint in version 0.17.1 allows any authenticated user, including low-privileged viewer accounts, to download sensitive application and nginx logs.

Because these logs contain auto-generated admin passwords and camera credentials in query strings, a viewer can escalate privileges to an administrator and gain broader system access.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in Frigate deployments using version 0.17.1 where:

  • The /api/logs/{service} endpoint is exposed to authenticated users.
  • Viewer-role accounts are permitted to access log download functionality.
  • Request query strings and authentication-related data are logged without redaction.

In such setups, logs produced by Frigate and nginx may persist sensitive credentials, making otherwise low-privileged users effectively able to recover administrative secrets.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP API endpoint GET /api/logs/{service} on the Frigate server.
  • Required access: Any authenticated Frigate account, including the viewer role.
  • Trigger point: Invoking the log download endpoint for Frigate or nginx logs.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Log files contain auto-generated admin passwords and camera credentials captured in request query strings, and the endpoint does not enforce strict authorization or redact secrets before delivery.

Why this happens

The core issue combines improper authorization enforcement with insecure logging practices.

Access control on the log download endpoint fails to distinguish between low-privileged viewer accounts and administrators (CWE-269, CWE-863), granting broad access to operational logs.

At the same time, the system records sensitive information—including admin passwords and camera credentials—inside logs, often from query strings (CWE-532, CWE-598).

Abstractly, this reflects a pattern where operational observability mechanisms (logging and diagnostics) are exposed without considering the sensitivity of their contents, allowing privilege boundaries to be bypassed via leaked secrets.

Potential impact

  • Viewer accounts may escalate privileges to administrator using recovered passwords.
  • Attackers can obtain camera credentials and gain unauthorized access to video streams.
  • Compromise of Frigate administrative console and configuration.
  • Potential lateral movement to other systems integrated with Frigate using shared credentials.
  • Disclosure of sensitive operational details that can aid further attacks.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation typically centers on tightening authorization and reducing sensitive data in logs.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Restricting access to diagnostic and log-download endpoints to high-privilege roles.
  • Designing logs to avoid storing secrets, credentials, and tokens—especially in query strings—and applying redaction or tokenization if sensitive fields must be recorded.
  • Favoring POST bodies over query parameters for sensitive values, combined with server-side controls that strip or mask credentials before logging.
  • Implementing least-privilege role definitions so that viewer roles cannot access administrative or operational data beyond their functional needs.
  • Applying defense-in-depth controls such as segregated logging infrastructure and tighter network access to log endpoints.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection commonly relies on a mix of configuration review and security-focused logging analysis.

Potential approaches include:

  • Reviewing API route definitions and middleware to ensure log-related endpoints enforce strict role-based authorization.
  • Using static analysis or configuration linting to flag logging of credential-like fields (password, key, token) and high-risk query parameters.
  • Conducting manual code reviews and threat modeling sessions focused on observability components—logs, metrics, and diagnostics—and their exposure to non-admin users.
  • Implementing policy-based checks in CI/CD pipelines that prohibit logging of sensitive data or require explicit redaction patterns for authentication-related fields.
  • Periodically scanning production logs for patterns resembling credentials to identify and remediate unsafe logging practices.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/blakeblackshear/frigate/commit/68e8afd35c76f05f68de47ee9588d2c91796de4b
github.comgithub.com/blakeblackshear/frigate/commit/bd1fc1cc72cd4fa371464a087cbf3d7f3142edc6
github.comgithub.com/blakeblackshear/frigate/security/advisories/GHSA-c4qf-xxq4-vf55

Frequently asked

questions

Any authenticated Frigate user, including those with viewer-level access, can exploit the issue via the exposed /api/logs/{service} HTTP endpoint, typically over the same network where the Frigate UI or API is reachable.

No. The vulnerability is explicitly that low-privileged viewer-role accounts are granted access to logs containing admin passwords and other sensitive data, enabling them to become administrators.

The safest approach is to combine strict authorization on log-related endpoints with a policy that prevents logging of secrets entirely, ensuring that only administrative roles can access operational logs and that those logs never contain credentials.

Future systems should treat observability surfaces as sensitive, apply role-based access control to diagnostic endpoints, avoid logging secrets or query-string credentials, and enforce secure defaults via automated checks and security-focused code review.

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