Summary
Poweradmin's authentication flows trust the attacker-controlled HTTP_HOST header when building redirect and callback URLs for OIDC, SAML, and logout endpoints.
An unauthenticated attacker can poison the redirect_uri sent to the Identity Provider, causing authorization codes to be sent to an attacker-controlled host and enabling full account takeover without user credentials.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs in Poweradmin's web-based DNS administration interface when it is configured to use OIDC or SAML for single sign-on and relies on dynamically constructed callback URLs.
It is relevant in deployments where the application derives the redirect or callback URI from the HTTP_HOST request header, and no additional validation or binding is applied between the application's expected origin and the Identity Provider's configuration.
The issue is most dangerous when external users access Poweradmin through browsers and the IdP accepts the manipulated redirect_uri provided by Poweradmin during the authentication flow.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Public-facing Poweradmin login and logout endpoints using OIDC or SAML.
- Required access: No authentication required; the attacker only needs network access to send crafted HTTP requests to the Poweradmin server.
- Trigger point: Initiation of an OIDC or SAML login (or logout) flow where Poweradmin constructs a
redirect_urior callback URL based on theHTTP_HOSTheader and sends it to the Identity Provider. - Why exploitation is possible: The application treats the unvalidated
HTTP_HOSTheader as trustworthy input when generating redirect URLs, enabling the attacker to influence where the IdP sends the authorization code or token and breaking the expected binding between user, application, and IdP.
Why this happens
The core issue is improper input validation (CWE-20) combined with an open redirect condition (CWE-601) in the authentication integration logic.
Poweradmin uses the HTTP_HOST header—fully controlled by the client or intermediate proxies—as the authoritative source for constructing callback and redirect URIs without checking that it matches a trusted domain or a preconfigured endpoint.
In federated authentication protocols such as OIDC and SAML, redirect URIs must be strictly validated and bound to the application's known origins; failing to enforce this allows attackers to redirect authorization codes to arbitrary hosts.
Abstractly, this reflects a pattern where security-sensitive URLs are derived from untrusted request metadata rather than stable configuration, causing protocol-level misbinding between the application and the Identity Provider.
Potential impact
- An attacker may receive authorization codes intended for the legitimate Poweradmin instance.
- An attacker could complete the token exchange flow and gain full access to victim accounts without knowing their credentials.
- The attacker may impersonate administrators and manipulate DNS records managed by Poweradmin.
- Compromise of DNS configurations could enable downstream attacks such as phishing, traffic hijacking, or domain takeover.
- Attackers can potentially chain this issue with other weaknesses (e.g., weak IdP settings) to broaden access across integrated systems.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation centers on removing trust in dynamic, client-controlled values when constructing redirect and callback URLs for authentication flows.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Derive redirect and callback URIs from static server-side configuration rather than request headers or query parameters.
- Enforce strict domain and path allowlists for any URL used in OIDC or SAML flows, ensuring only pre-registered endpoints are ever sent to the Identity Provider.
- Implement robust input validation on host and URL parameters, rejecting requests where
HTTP_HOSTdoes not match the expected application hostname or configured list. - Bind redirect URIs in the Identity Provider configuration to specific, known endpoints and disable dynamic or wildcard redirect behavior.
- Reduce privilege by segregating administrative functions and ensuring session tokens or authorization codes are only usable by the intended application instance.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar vulnerabilities by:
- Reviewing authentication integration code for any use of
HTTP_HOST,Host, or other request-derived data in constructing redirect or callback URLs. - Applying static analysis rules that flag dynamic URL generation for security-sensitive flows (login, logout, OAuth/OIDC/SAML redirects) without validation or allowlisting.
- Performing targeted security code reviews around SSO and IdP integration logic, checking that redirect URIs are strictly configured and not influenced by user input.
- Enforcing architectural policies that require URLs for authentication endpoints to be centrally configured rather than computed from request metadata.
- Using automated web security testing tools to probe for open redirect behaviors in login and logout flows and verifying misbinding possibilities with test IdP configurations.

